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ABSTRACT 
My dissertation addresses two important individual level decisions: the choice of 
location made by young college graduates and the demand for owner-occupied housing. 
Young college graduates are an important component of the skilled labor force and one of 
the population groups with the highest risk of relocation. As a result, they are often 
targeted by state level policies aimed at attracting or retaining them in the labor force. My 
research reveals an important factor that determines the location chosen by young college 
graduates at the beginning of their career, and therefore informs policy makers on novel 
ways to make a location more attractive for this group. The second part of my dissertation 
addresses the empirical analysis of the demand for housing services. My research 
attempts to explain the large differences among the estimates of the slope of the demand 
for housing services found in the literature. The second objective is to assess the 
existence of an asset appreciation effect of the price of owner-occupied housing services 
on the quantity demanded of owner-occupied housing services, which may explain recent 
price bubbles in the U.S. housing market. 
In the first chapter I develop and estimate a dynamic model of location choice for 
young college graduates. My theoretical model predicts that individuals who are 
uncertain about their earnings prospects in different locations will prefer to move to the 
place with the highest earnings variance, all else equal. This result follows from the 
dynamic nature of the location choice decision: if earnings in the first location turn out 
unsatisfactory, the individual can always move to a location with better prospects. 
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Mobility limits the loss of earnings from a low realization of earnings to just oneperiod. I 
test the theoretical implications using a nested logit model that allows for over one 
hundred location choices. Using a large sample of young college graduates from the 2000 
US Census, I find a higher earnings variance increases the probability of choosing a 
location with low to moderate earnings variance. Increasing the earnings variance for 
locations with high earnings variance may increase or decrease their choice probability, 
depending on the specific combination of mean and variance of their earnings 
distribution. Estimates from a random parameters logit model suggest that preferences for 
mean earnings and earnings variance show very little variation across individuals in my 
sample. 
In the second chapter I take a semi-non-parametric approach to the estimation of the 
demand for housing services. Previous studies have found very different estimates for the 
slope of the demand for owner-occupied housing services. These differences may be an 
artifact of restrictive parametric methods used to estimate the hedonic functions in the 
first step of the analysis. In this paper I estimate the demand for owner-occupied housing 
services using the semi-non-parametric Fourier series estimator to fit the hedonic price 
functions, and compare the results to some of the parametric methods of estimation used 
in the literature. I find that changing the estimation method of the hedonic functions leads 
to different estimates for the slope of the demand, but the estimation method alone cannot 
explain the large differences found in the literature. Further evidence suggests that the 
Box-Cox model used in the literature may be overly restrictive for estimating housing 
hedonic functions. The second objective of this paper is to assess the existence of an asset 
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appreciation effect of owner-occupied housing price on owner-occupied housing 
consumption, in the light of the recent finding in the literature of a positive effect of price 
on the quantity demanded of owner-occupied housing services. This may again be the 
result of using a restrictive parametric method in the first step or it may be an effect 
specific to some localized markets. Using data on multiple housing markets, I find 
evidence of a negative effect of price on quantity, under the assumption of homogenous 
preferences across housing markets. When I relax the homogeneity assumption and allow 
for state specific effects, I find evidence consistent with an asset appreciation effect in 
about half of the U.S. states. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
A MODEL OF LOCATION CHOICE FOR YOUNG COLLEGE GRADUATES 
1. Introduction 
Many young workers choose jobs or places to live characterized by uncertain and 
highly variable earnings prospects. Some may attribute this behavior to youthful 
exuberance or the attraction of the “bright lights” of the city, but economic theory 
provides a compelling reason why this could be considered optimizing behavior. It is 
reasonable to assume that individuals are uncertain about their earnings prospects in 
locations they have never visited. If an individual chooses a location not only for its 
immediate payoff but also for its future opportunities, then it might be rational to choose 
the location which offers a chance at the highest earnings, even if the probability of 
realizing it is low. A high realization will benefit the individual for multiple periods while 
a low realization is only a one-period loss; the individual can offset unexpectedly low 
earnings by moving to another location in the next period. The essence of the dynamic 
model under uncertainty is that the possibility of a one-time loss may be traded for the 
opportunity of a lifetime of high earnings. A static economic model of location choice 
would fail to capture this potential “option value” of a location and put too much weight 
on current earnings. 
This implication is not new to the discrete choice literature. Johnson (1978) 
formalized the idea in a model of mobility between jobs under uncertainty and imperfect 
information. The job shopping model implies that individuals will always choose the job 
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with the higher earnings variance first, because they may choose again if they had bad 
luck with the first job. Nuanced versions of this implication are also found in Viscusi 
(1980), Miller (1984) and Borjas et al. (1992). In the migration literature Pessino (1991) 
is among the first to apply a similar model to sequential location choice decisions. Her 
model implies that individuals choose the location offering the highest potential of 
learning about their earnings prospects. 
The idea that investments in some assets are more valuable, the higher the variance of 
their returns is found in the financial investment field as well (the Black-Scholes 
formula). The choice of a location resembles an investor’s decision to buy a call option. 
The investor has the right, but not the obligation to execute the contract and decisions are 
made sequentially as new information becomes available. Applied to the location choice 
decision, the argument is that if true earnings – which are revealed upon moving to the 
location – are higher than expected earnings, then at the beginning of the next period the 
individual decides to stay (executes the call option) and collects the present value of 
lifetime gains. If true earnings are low, the individual moves to another location (e.g., lets 
the option expire) where he expects to receive the mean of the earnings distribution and 
thus limits the loss to one period. Similar to a call option, the expected return from 
choosing a location is bound from below. Since mobility makes the lower tail of the 
earnings distribution irrelevant to future expected earnings, one might as well choose the 
location with the highest earnings variance, as it offers the best chance at the highest 
earnings. Furthermore, if we assume the moving costs are similar for all locations, the 
cost of the option is the same for high and low variance locations. Once a location has 
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been chosen, all moving costs and losses from unfavorable earnings are sunk and the only 
relevant cost is the cost of moving to the new location. Migration choices that some may 
attribute to risk-loving behavior and the “bright lights” of the big city may actually be the 
result of forward-looking behavior by individuals who are seeking to maximize utility 
under uncertainty about their earnings prospects. To my knowledge this important 
theoretical implication has not been tested directly in a multiple-choice migration setting 
by any study, and this is the main objective of the paper.  
The theoretical model developed in this paper contributes to the dynamic discrete 
choice literature on migration. Following the general setup found in Pessino (1991), I 
develop a model of location choice under uncertainty which implies that young college 
graduates will choose the location with the highest earnings variance, everything else 
equal. I simplify the model developed in Pessino (1991) by assuming perfect learning. As 
a result, earnings variance measures the opportunity of a high gain – the “option value” of 
the location. I test this theoretical implication against the data using a multiple-location 
framework. Complex methods for estimating dynamic models of location choice have 
been developed recently in the migration literature (see, for example, Kennan and Walker 
in 2008, Bishop in 2007). An important shortcoming of these methods is that their 
implementation requires trade-offs between the number of locations, the number of 
location characteristics, the number of states of the world and the number of time periods. 
I eliminate some of these trade-offs by using an approximation to the structural model. 
This method allows for a large number of choices and a rich specification for the per-
period utility function compared to what other researchers have used with more formal 
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structural models. The approach used here provides clear evidence of the importance of 
earnings variance for migration decisions. 
 Using a large sample of young college graduates from the 2000 US Census I estimate 
a nested logit model allowing for over 100 location choices. While previous studies have 
addressed the theoretical effect of earnings variance on the location choice decision, and 
some have searched for empirical evidence, this paper is the first to test the hypothesis in 
a multi-choice setting. Results from observations on more than 100,000 individuals of 
age 23 - 27 suggest that earnings variance may be an important determinant of individual 
location choice. A higher earnings variance increases the probability of choosing a 
location with low to moderate earnings variance. Increasing the earnings variance for 
locations with high earnings variance may increase or decrease their choice probability, 
depending on the specific combination of mean and variance of their earnings 
distribution; a high enough level of mean earnings is necessary to ensure a positive effect. 
Further evidence suggests that in order to ensure the highest favorable effect, increases in 
earnings standard deviation should be accompanied by increases in mean earnings, and 
vice-versa. Estimates from a random parameters logit model suggest that preferences for 
mean earnings and earnings variance show very little variation across individuals in my 
sample. 
2. Literature Review 
The neo-classical approach to migration is due to Sjaastad (1962) who pioneered the 
literature on individual migration behavior. Previous studies attempted to explain the 
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discrepancy between sizeable flows of migration and the persistence of earnings 
differentials across locations using aggregate models. Sjaastad observed that migration is 
an individual level decision and therefore its analysis should be based on a well-defined 
economic criterion - utility maximization. Aggregate level studies had failed to identify 
such criteria. 
Building on the neo-classical approach, recent economic models increasingly 
recognize the importance of uncertainty in the individual decision process. In the job 
search literature, Johnson (1978) is among the first to develop a model of mobility 
between jobs under uncertainty and imperfect information. In his two-period model, an 
individual who is uncertain about his skills chooses a job in each time period, seeking to 
maximize expected lifetime earnings. Jobs are different in their return to skills and job 
specific uncertainty. There are two sources of earnings uncertainty: an individual specific 
component due to uncertainty about his skills, and a job specific component that is 
similar for all individuals. This structure of uncertainty is found in much of the literature 
that followed, but some models focus on only one of the two components. While 
experiencing different jobs, the individual learns about his skills. Information 
accumulated this way may be used to predict earnings for other jobs or better predict 
future earnings for the current job. The main implication of Johnson’s model is that 
individuals will always start with the job with the highest earnings variance, given equal 
mean earnings. Job mobility is therefore the expression of a process through which 
individuals learn about their skills. A similar prediction is found in models that focus 
exclusively on individual specific uncertainty: Viscusi (1980) generalizes the job choice 
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model by introducing Bayesian updating of beliefs; Miller (1984) conditions learning on 
the length of job tenure, therefore amplifying the effect of individual uncertainty for the 
young and the inexperienced. 
Job shopping models can be easily extended to location choice decisions. Pessino 
(1991) is among the first to develop a sequential model of location choice similar to 
Johnson’s (1978) job shopping model. The main objective of the model is to formalize 
the existence of return and forward migration, and the large correlation between in- and 
out-migration rates at location level. Her model implies that individuals’ first choice is 
the location with the highest learning potential (in the model, the ratio of individual 
uncertainty to location specific uncertainty). Unlike in previous models of choice, in 
Pessino’s model the structure of uncertainty becomes important for the value of the 
location. Individual specific uncertainty is a valuable characteristic, as it offers scope for 
learning, but location specific uncertainty has a deterring effect because it slows the 
learning process. Using a sample from Peru, she finds evidence that repeat migration is 
an expression of learning induced migration and this process is likely to be the source of 
highly correlated in- and out-migration flows at location level. 
The result of the model developed in Borjas et al. (1992) more closely parallels the 
results of Johnson’s (1978) model. Their model is based on individual uncertainty only 
and information received in one location may be used to predict earnings in other 
locations. The model predicts that skilled individuals will select themselves into locations 
with high returns to skills, which are also the locations with high earnings variance. In 
this model migration is driven by the mismatch between the skills of the individual and 
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the return to skills in the location where he enters the labor market for the first time. The 
study finds evidence that educated individuals tend to choose destinations with higher 
earnings variance than the origin location. Other models are built on location specific 
uncertainty only; Harris & Sabot (1982) develop a model in which unemployment is the 
rational activity of searching information in a market where returns to labor are uncertain. 
The model predicts that high wage dispersion will lower the attractiveness of a location 
because it delays finding the best job and thus reduces the present value of earnings. This 
result is not surprising given the static framework of their model. To summarize, current 
theoretical models in the literature imply that individual specific uncertainty has a 
positive effect on the value of a location, while location specific uncertainty has a 
negative effect. 
Young college graduates have not received a great deal of attention in the economic 
literature on migration, even though they may be considered a fairly important group 
from a migration analysis perspective. Their high skills and low moving costs suggest a 
high propensity to migrate. Kodrzycki (2001) analyzes the factors determining the 
migration of recent college graduates in the first five years after the completion of 
schooling. Evidence from a model of out-migration estimated using the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) shows that individual characteristics are more 
important than economic characteristics in explaining the move/stay decision. The study 
concludes that the success of a firm in recruiting young college graduates does not 
depend on the location where it does business, but on the capacity of the firm to match 
individuals to appropriate jobs. An important shortcoming of such theoretical models is 
 8 
 
that the decision to move or stay is separate from the choice of a particular destination. 
More recently, Gottlieb and Joseph (2006) estimate the importance of location 
characteristics for the migration decisions of technology graduates and doctorate holders 
in the U.S. Using a random parameter logit model with fifty choices, they find that 
location amenities are only of second importance compared to economic and 
demographic location characteristics and the effect varies by educational groups. Unlike 
previous studies, their paper ignores the mean income as a variable determining the 
location choice decision. Further evidence on the migration behavior of educated 
individuals is found in Compton and Pollak (2007). They test the hypothesis that power 
couples (couples in which both spouses have college degrees) tend to choose larger cities 
as their destination than do part-power couples or singles. Evidence from a sample of 
young individuals does not support the hypothesis of co-location but rather suggests that 
college educated singles tend to move to large MSAs, where they then form couples. 
Dynamic models with multiple location choices have been estimated recently in 
Kennan and Walker (2008) and Bishop (2007). Kennan and Walker investigate the 
importance of expected income for the migration decisions of high-school graduates. The 
choice of a location is jointly modeled with the earnings realizations. To make the 
method tractable several restrictions are required: the choice set is restricted to U.S. 
states, the number of location amenities is small, amenities are restricted to be time-
invariant and perfectly observed, and the earnings history available to individuals is 
truncated after two periods. Using the 1979 wave of the NLSY, Kennan and Walker find 
strong evidence that migration is driven by differences in expected income across 
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locations, and suggest that unobserved location match effects are important for location 
choices. Bishop (2007) estimates a fully dynamic model of individual migration using the 
two-step method developed in Arcidiacono and Miller (2007). The method offers the 
benefit of a rich specification for the utility function and time-varying amenities. Using 
data from the NLSY, she finds that the willingness to pay for air quality is much higher 
than what static models imply. 
3. Theoretical Model 
In this section I present a dynamic model of location choice under uncertainty about 
earnings prospects. My model is similar to the sequential migration model developed in 
Pessino (1991), with the exception that uncertainty in my model stems exclusively from 
the individual specific uncertainty. Additionally, in my model location amenities are also 
a determinant of location payoff. 
Consider a multiple period model in which the individual maximizes lifetime utility 
by choosing location j from a set of J possible locations (j = 1…J) in each time period t (t 
=1…T). The per-period payoff consists of the flow utility U(·) derived from earnings wjt 
and location characteristics Lj, net of moving costs Msj. Relocation from location s to 
location j incurs monetary and non-monetary moving costs Msj. Assume all components 
are measured in utility units and denote Xjt as the vector including wjt, Lj and Msj. If flow 
utility is linearly-additive in its components, the payoff from choosing location j in period 
t may be written as:  
 ( )jt jt j sjU X w L M= + −
 
(1) 
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where I use the “~” symbol to denote a random variable (Note that earnings are the only 
random component of the X vector). If the destination location j is different from starting 
location s, the individual incurs moving costs Msj (with Mss=0). I assume the individual 
knows the earnings distribution for each location but not the true earnings he will receive. 
At the beginning of the first period the individual expects to receive the mean of the 
earnings distribution in each location. Figure 1.1 presents the timing of the decision. 
After visiting location j and observing the earnings realization wjt, the individual updates 
his beliefs about earnings opportunities in location j to wjt for all future periods. In other 
words, I assume perfect learning. I also maintain the “shopping” aspect found in job 
shopping models: the individual can only learn about his true earnings by experiencing 
the location. At the same time, no information is received about the expected payoff in 
any other location. While instantaneous learning may seem unrealistic, we can always 
define sufficiently long time periods such that perfect learning takes place (in estimation I 
use migration at five years). The individual believes earnings  jtw , to be normally 
distributed with mean jw  and variance 2jσ . I assume that location characteristics Lj are 
perfectly observed by the individual and time invariant. This simplification allows me to 
focus on earnings variance as the main source of uncertainty in the location choice 
process. I believe the cost imposed by this assumption is small considering the abundance 
of information on location amenities and their inertia over time. 
Like most theoretical models in this literature, I assume a finite horizon. This 
assumption offers the benefit of a closed-form solution for the location payoff. For 
expositional purposes I consider only two locations, j = 1,2 and two periods, t = 1,2,  
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with the observation that the model can be extended for multiple locations at the cost of 
increased complexity.1 I now derive the lifetime payoff from choosing location 1 in the 
first period: I start with the decision at the beginning of the second period given a realized 
outcome in period 1; I then shift the point of view to the beginning of the first period. 
Given a realization w11 in location 1 in the first period, in the second period the 
individual expects to receive 
 12 121 11 1 11 1 11 1( | ) ( | )EU X w E w w L w L= + = +
 
(2) 
if he chooses to stay in location 1. The last equality follows from the assumption of 
perfect learning. If the individual instead moves to location 2 in the second period, his 
expected payoff is 
 22 22 21 11 1 11 2 12 2 12( | ) ( | )EU X w E w w L M w L M= + − = + −
 
(3) 
where the last equality implies that experiencing location 1 offers no information about 
the expected earnings in location 2. 
I now shift the point of view to the beginning of the first period. As a consequence, 
the realization w11 becomes unknown to the individual. At the beginning of period 1, 
choosing location 1 gives the individual the expected flow utility in period 1 plus the 
expectation (over realizations of w11) of the discounted payoff from the second period. 
The latter is the maximum between choosing to stay in location 1 and receiving the 
payoff described by Equation (2) or moving to location 2 and receiving the payoff 
described by Equation (3): 
                                                          
1
 Extending the model to 3 periods complicates the problem to a degree where no clear predictions may be 
derived. The expression for the second period expected payoff involves taking the expectation of non-linear 
terms and therefore no closed form solution is possible for this model. 
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  11 11 11 20 1 0 0 1 2 12( ) ( ) [max{ , }]E V X E U X E w L w L Mδ= + ⋅ + + −
 
(4) 
where V1(•) is the first-period value function associated with location 1. Replacing in for 
the first period utility, we have: 
 11 1 11 20 1 1 1 0 1 2 12( ) [max{ , }]sE V X w L M E w L w L Mδ= + − + ⋅ + + −
 
(5) 
The first argument of the maximum operator is a random variable while the second is a 
constant. We may simplify the expression by subtracting the constant from both terms: 


11 10 1 1 1
2 11 22 12 0 1 2 12
( )
( ) [max{ ( ),0}]
sE V X w L M
w L M E w L w L Mδ δ
= + −
+ ⋅ + − + ⋅ + − + −
 (6) 
Equation (6) may be interpreted as follows: by choosing location 1, the individual 
receives the mean utility from the first period plus the discounted payoff from the second 
period. The latter consists of two components: the mean expected utility in location two 
and a term which is bound from below at zero. This last term is similar to the payoff of a 
call option in financial markets. If earnings realized in location 1 are high enough, the 
individual stays in location 1 (executes the option) and enjoys a utility gain over what 
was expected from location 2. It the realization is low, the value of the option is zero and 
the individual moves to location 2 (lets the option expire) where he receives the mean 
per-period utility net of moving costs. Any loss over the mean utility in location 2 may be 
avoided by moving there in period 2. Note that if individuals are completely impatient 
(i.e. δ = 0), we have the classical result from static models that differences in current 
mean earnings and amenities drive migration. At this point I make use of the normality 
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assumption I placed on earnings, which allows me to obtain a closed form solution for the 
location “option value” in equation (6):2 
11 10 1 1 1
2 12 12 1
2 2 12 1
1
( )
( )( )
sE V X w L M
w L M w L
w L Mδ δ σ
σ
= + −
 + − − ++ ⋅ + − + ⋅ ⋅Ψ   
 (7) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )1s s s sφΨ = − ⋅ − Φ    is a non-negative monotonically decreasing convex 
function in its argument.3 The option value of location 1 increases with a higher mean 
payoff from location 1 (the market price of the stock) and decreases with a higher mean 
payoff from moving to location 2 (the strike price). Taking the partial derivative with 
respect to σ1 yields: 
11 2 10 1 2 12 1
1 1
( ) ( )E V X w L M w Lδ φσ σ
 ∂ + − − += ⋅  ∂  
 (8) 
The expression above suggests that an increase in earnings standard deviation in location 
1 increases the lifetime payoff associated with this location. The second order derivative 
with respect to σ1 suggests that the effect is increasing in the earnings standard deviation 
(equation 13 in the Appendix). 
The model predicts that, given equal per-period expected utilities in each location, the 
individual will choose the location with the highest earnings variance. The intuition is 
that a risk-neutral individual confronted with a choice between two unknown locations, 
both offering the same mean utility, might as well choose the location which offers a 
                                                          
2
 See the Appendix for derivation. This expression is similar to the normal transform described in DeGroot 
(1969), pg. 247. 
3
 See Appendix for derivations. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' 1, ' 0, " 0s s s sΨ = Φ − Ψ < Ψ >  
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chance at the highest earnings, even if the probability of realizing it is low. If high 
earnings are realized, the individual may choose to stay and capitalize on the gain for 
multiple periods. If earnings are low, the individual can limit the loss to one period by 
moving to another location. Furthermore, if I assume that moving costs between the two 
locations are equal, the cost of choosing the high variance or the low variance location is 
the same. Once a location has been chosen, all moving costs and losses from unfavorable 
earnings are sunk, so the only relevant cost is the cost of moving to the new location. 
This result is similar to Johnson’s (1978) predictions, but different from Pessino’s 
(1991). In the latter, individuals prefer the location which offers the greatest potential for 
learning (ratio of individual specific uncertainty to location specific uncertainty). The 
source of the difference between this model and Pessino’s is the assumption of no 
location-specific uncertainty. In this model all uncertainty is individual-specific and 
therefore informative about future earnings prospects. If one believes that, for young 
college graduates the individual specific uncertainty (inability to predict expected 
earnings) is overwhelmingly higher than the location specific uncertainty (labor market 
shocks), then ignoring the latter may be a realistic assumption. In practice, this 
assumption offers the benefit of a directly testable hypothesis, while Pessino’s setting 
requires a measure for the learning potential of a location. The two models also differ in 
the timing and motivation of return migration. In my model, the individual returns to a 
previous location when the current utility gain from moving to this known location 
exceeds the value of the option associated with an unknown location. In Pessino’s model 
individuals may also return if, after updating beliefs about subsequent locations, one of 
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the previous locations becomes the one offering the highest learning potential. My model 
predicts faster turnover than a model with imperfect learning: individuals leave after one 
period if the realization is lower than the net expected payoff from other locations. The 
empirical design does not allow me to test the implications related to the motivation of 
return migration and the migration turnover, but they may be important extensions for 
future research. 
4. Empirical Model and Data 
4.1. Empirical Model 
In the previous section I developed a location choice model based on uncertainty 
about earnings and perfectly observed location characteristics. While information on the 
earnings distribution may be equally available to the individual and the researcher, it is 
realistic to assume that some location attributes which were part of the individual 
decision may not be observed by the researcher. For my empirical analysis I assume that 
location characteristics Lj are of two types: Aij are observed by both the individual and 
the researcher, and ξijt, which are unobserved to the researcher. Equations (2) and (3) now 
become: 
  12 1211 11 1 12 11( | ) ( | ) ( | )i ii i i i iEU X w E w w A E wξ= + +
 
(2’) 
and: 
  22 2211 11 2 22 11 12( | ) ( | ) ( | )i ii i i i i iEU X w E w w A E w Mξ= + + −
 
(3’) 
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A common assumption in the literature is that unobserved location characteristics  ijtξ  
follow the type I extreme value distribution with mean γ (γ = 0.577, the Euler-
Mascheroni constant). Further assuming that they are uncorrelated with earnings, allows 
me to write the value function of choosing location 1 in the first period as follows: 
 

110 1 11 11
1 21 1 2 12
2 12 12 1
1 11
1
( )
( )
( )
i i i
i ii is i i
i ii i i
i i
i
E V X V
w A M w A M
w A M w A
ξ
δ γ
δ σ ξσ
= +
= + − + ⋅ + + −
 + − − ++ ⋅ ⋅Ψ +  
 
(7’) 
The main difference over static models of migration is that the location payoff Vij1 
depends on current earnings and amenities but also on the option value of the location. 
The option value of the location is measured by the expected payoff exceeding the 
highest mean utility among alternative locations. Under the assumption that earnings 
follow a normal distribution, I have shown that this term depends directly on the variance 
of location earnings. In practice I approximate the lifetime payoff associated with a 
location by a flexible reduced form including mean earnings, earnings standard deviation, 
amenities and moving costs:4 
( ) ( ), , ,ijij ij j ijV V h w A m Mσ =  
 
(9) 
where ijw  denotes mean earnings for individual i in location j, ijσ  denotes standard 
deviation of earnings, Aj denotes location amenities (assumed constant across 
individuals), and Mij denotes moving costs to location j.  Since the theoretical model 
implies that the option value depends non-linearly on mean earnings and earnings 
                                                          
4
 I drop the time subscript and proceed with the convention that all location payoffs are lifetime payoffs 
measured at the beginning of period 1. 
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standard deviation, and the effect is non-separable, I specify the h(·) function to include 
higher order polynomial terms of both (up to 5th order) and interactions  . 
The individual chooses location j among the J possible choices if the payoff 
associated with location j exceeds the payoff associated with every other location k: 
 
, 2...ij ij ik ikV V k Jξ ξ+ > + ∀ =
 
(10) 
Various restrictions on the covariance matrix of the unobserved terms  ijξ  (across 
individuals and locations) lead to different implementations of the multinomial logit 
model. I consider the conditional logit, the nested logit and the random parameter logit.5 
The conditional logit (CL) model is the most restrictive model of the three, but also 
the easiest to implement. It assumes that errors are independently distributed across 
locations and individuals, i.e.  ( )  ( ), 0, , 0ij ik ij hjCov Covξ ξ ξ ξ= = . In other words, the 
utility shock the individual receives in location j provides no information to the 
statistician about the utility shock individual i would receive in location k, or the utility 
shock individual h would receive in location j. The probability that individual i chooses 
location j in period 1 may be written as: 
1
ij
ik
V
ij J
V
k
ep
e
=
=
∑
 
(11) 
I assume the observed part of lifetime utility associated with location j, Vij can be 
approximated using the following function: 
                                                          
5
 The Random Parameter Logit can also be described by a multinomial logit model in which the errors are 
allowed to be correlated across all locations from which an individual may choose, not just within groups 
of locations.  
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( , , ) ( , , , )ijisj ij g g n n j sj bj iV h w I I A m M M aσ α δ δ β pi= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +  (12) 
where Visj denotes the lifetime payoff individual i receives from choosing location j, 
when starting in location s in period 1. In addition to the variables described above, ai 
denotes the age, Msj denotes the distance between the origin location s and location j, Mbj 
denotes the distance from the birth place b to location j, Ig is an indicator for state g and In 
is an indicator for location group n. The parameter vectors α, β, δ’s and pi are to be 
estimated. An important limitation of the conditional logit model is its assumption of 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which implies that the ratio of the 
choice probabilities of two locations depends on the characteristics of these two locations 
only. 
The Nested Logit (NL) model allows the errors of alternatives within a group of 
locations n to be correlated for individual i,  ( ), 0ijn iknCov ξ ξ ≠  but uncorrelated 
otherwise:  ( )  ( ), 0, , 0ijn ijl ijn hjnCov Covξ ξ ξ ξ= = . This covariance structure is obtained by 
specifying the unobserved location characteristics as  ijn in ijξ η ε= + , where ηin is a random 
variable with mean zero and variance σn2, and εij is identically and independently 
distributed (i.i.d) across individuals and locations. The two components are distributed 
such that  ijnξ  follows the extreme value distribution with mean γ, variance (σn2 + pi2/6), 
and covariance structure described above. The NL allows for different individuals to 
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receive different utility shocks when choosing a location from group (nest) n.6 An 
obvious choice for nesting the locations is by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) status, 
as we would expect that MSAs are quite different from non-MSA locations (see the 
discussion in the Data section). I use is the following specification for the observed part 
of the utility: 
( , , ) ( , , , )ijisj ij g g j i sj bjV h w I A m a M Mσ α δ β pi= + ⋅ + ⋅ +  (13) 
where all the variables have been defined above. Allowing the errors to be correlated 
within each nest n yields the following estimating equation: 
| 2
1
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nn in
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e ep p p
e e
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ρ ρ
  ⋅  
 ⋅   
= =
= ⋅ = ⋅
∑ ∑
 
(14) 
Equation (14) shows the expression for the unconditional probability of choosing 
location j in nest n. The first term, pin is the unconditional probability of choosing nest n 
among the two nests. The second term, pij|n is the conditional probability of choosing 
location j among Rn possible locations, given that nest n has been chosen. The parameter 
ρn is a measure of the correlation between the errors of the alternatives in group n: 
 ( )1 ,n ijn iknCorrρ ξ ξ= −  (15) 
If all ρn are 1, the model reduces to the conditional logit model (there is no correlation 
among errors of alternatives within groups). This correlation structure relaxes the IIA 
assumption for two locations belonging to different nests, but maintains the restriction for 
                                                          
6
 Notice that assuming equal location specific effects for all individuals choosing a location (ηin = ηhn =… = 
ηn) allows the model to be estimated using the Conditional Logit model with specification (12). Under this 
restriction, all individuals who choose a location in group n receive the same utility shock. 
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locations within the same nest n. The term ρn·Iin represents the expected utility from 
being able to choose the best alternative in nest n. In is called the inclusive value and is 
calculated as follows: 
1
ln
ir
n
n
VR
in
r
I e ρ
   
=
  =   
∑ (16) 
The Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model allows the errors to be correlated across 
all alternatives for the same individual. In my analysis I allow preferences over mean 
earnings and earnings standard deviation to differ across individuals, and I assume that 
the tastes for other location amenities are homogeneous. The following specification is 
used for the observed part of utility: 
( , , ) ( , , , )ijij ij j i sj bjV h w A m a M Mσ α β pi= + ⋅ +  (17) 
where the parameter vector α is distributed normally with mean µα and standard deviation 
σα. The RPL allows each individual i to display a personal taste for mean earnings and 
earning standard deviation, rather than assuming that all individuals have the same tastes 
(i.e., the coefficients on mean earnings and earnings standard deviation are the same for 
all individuals). This structure allows the possibility that some individuals see earnings 
variation as an opportunity while others perceive it as a nuisance. The estimation of the 
RPL is done using Maximum Simulated Likelihood.7 
The effects of the earnings variance and mean earnings are presented in terms of 
marginal effects on the choice probability. Marginal effects offer the benefit of a better 
                                                          
7
 I thank Prof. Kenneth Train for making the code available on his website. Due to computational 
limitations, a much simpler function h(·) is used for this model and I do not control for state specific 
effects. 
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quantifiable effect and a safer scale for comparisons (see Mroz and Zayats, 2008). The 
first step in the empirical analysis shows that the nested logit model offers the best fit for 
my data. Therefore, all marginal effects shown in the paper are based on the nested logit 
model. I present the marginal effects in two ways: in percentage points and as a 
percentage of the choice probability. Marginal effects presented in percentage points 
(M1) are calculated using the classical formula and represent the average change in the 
probability of the marginal individual choosing a location. Marginal effects as percentage 
of the choice probability (M2) are obtained by dividing (M1) by the probability of 
choosing the location. Since the choice probability for location j can also be interpreted 
as the share of the population choosing location j, (M2) has the intuitive interpretation of 
the percentage change in the proportion of individuals choosing location j. 
For the NL model, the average percentage points change (M1) in the probability of 
choosing location j, following a one unit increase in the earnings standard deviation for 
location j, everything else constant, is calculated as: 
( ) ( )| | |
1 1
( , )1 1 11 1
j jN N ijijn ij
in ij n ij n in in ij n
i ij ij j ij n
P h w
P P P P P P
N N
σ
σ σ ρ= =
 ∂ ∂   = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ −  ∂ ∂   ∑ ∑  (18) 
The average percentage change (M2) in the proportion of individuals choosing 
location j is calculated using the following formula: 
( ) ( )| |
1 1
( , )1 1 11 1
j jN N ij ijijn
ijn ij n in in ij n
i iijj j ij n
h wP
P P P P P
N N
σ
σ σ ρ= =
   ∂∂   = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ −     ∂ ∂     ∑ ∑  (19) 
Similar formulae are used to calculate the effect of mean earnings. 
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I calculate marginal cross-effects in percentage points (M1) showing the effect of a 
change in the earnings distribution in one location on the probability of choosing another 
location. The average effect of a one unit increase in the standard deviation of earnings in 
location k on the probability of choosing location j when both locations belong to nest n 
is calculated using the following formula: 
| |
1 1
1 1 ( , ) 11
j jN N
ikijn ik
in in ij n ik n
i ij ik j ik n
P h w P P P P
N N
σ
σ σ ρ= =
 ∂  ∂ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅  ∂ ∂   ∑ ∑  (20) 
When j and k belong to different nests (n and m respectively), the following formula is 
used: 
1 1
1 1 ( , )( 1)
j jN N
ikmijn ikm
ij ik
i ij ikm j ikm
P h w P P
N N
σ
σ σ= =
∂  ∂= − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∑ ∑  (21) 
A caveat is in order regarding the interpretation of the effects described in this 
section. Due to the dynamic nature of the model, the effect of changing the mean will 
have a lifetime effect interpretation: it is the sum of the effect on the first period payoff 
and the discounted effect on the second period value function.8 Same holds for amenities. 
The estimates for the effect of these variables should be viewed as an upper limit for the 
per-period true effects. 
                                                          
8
 Mean earnings of the location show up twice in the lifetime payoff from choosing the location (see 
equation 7’): in the first period payoff and in the option value term, discounted. For expositional purposes, 
assume the effect on both these terms is the same (α) and that it is linearly additive. The polynomial I 
estimate is then an approximation of: α·mean + α·δ·mean, where δ is the discount factor. Therefore the 
marginal effects are proportional to α·(1 + δ). If the discount factor is δ = 0.95, the per-period effect is 
proportional to half of the marginal effect shown. 
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4.2. Data 
I use data from the 5% sample of the 2000 US Census provided by IPUMS9. For each 
individual the Census reports the current residence (subject to disclosure restrictions) and 
the location where they lived 5 years ago (i.e. 1995). I restrict my sample to individuals 
of age 23 to 27 in 2000, who have earned at least a Bachelor’s degree. This restriction 
should make it more likely that I observe migration decisions that are influenced by 
career considerations, and that these decisions are made at a time when the individual has 
limited information on earnings prospects. Figure 1.2 shows that migration rates of 
college graduates between 21 and 50 in the Census peak at the age of 26 and then decline 
steadily. As expected, younger individuals are at higher risk of moving than older 
individuals:  about 55% of college graduates between 23 and 27 have moved to another 
Public Use Micro-Area (PUMA) in the past 5 years while only 40% of those between 28 
and 35 have moved. 
There are approximately 195,000 college graduates of age 23 - 27 in my sample. I 
exclude individuals born outside of U.S., those who have moved outside of U.S. or have 
moved in from another country in the past five years, individuals who live in group 
quarters, and individuals who have a work disability. These exclusions are motivated by 
the fact that these individuals may have significantly different tastes and constraints than 
my focus group, and therefore their location choice decisions may be very different. I 
also exclude individuals who report being enrolled in school and those who are employed 
                                                          
9
 Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly 
Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander.  Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008. 
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by the U.S. Army, since their mobility and choice of location are restricted relative to the 
general population. After imposing these restrictions I am left with about 115,000 
individuals.10 Due to missing data on location characteristics I exclude all individuals 
residing in four locations and end up with a final dataset of 113,834 individuals.11 
Selected demographics for my final sample are presented in Table 1.1. The average 
individual is 25 years old and more likely to be a white female. Migrants and non-
migrants are very similar in terms of age, race and gender but migrants are 30% more 
likely to have a graduate degree. The average migrant worked almost two additional 
hours per week and one additional week per year, and earned almost $3,000 more in total 
income compared to the average non-migrant. 
An important aspect of any multi-location analysis is the set of choices available to 
the decision maker. Since the crucial location characteristic in my model is the earnings 
distribution, I want to define locations that have well-delimited labor markets, 
characterized by distinct earnings distributions. A too broadly defined location would fail 
to capture the true earnings distribution which determined the individual decision (e.g., 
the earnings distribution for New York City is very different from the earnings 
distribution for the state of New York), and at the same time leads to overlooking a 
substantial number of relocations. On the other hand, information on location 
characteristics is not available at a very low level of geographical aggregation (for 
example, counties), which would result in loss of observations. The metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) is the geographical unit most frequently used in the analysis of 
                                                          
10
 See the Appendix for a full description of the data filtering process. 
11The four locations are: Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA; Hawaii; Maine; and Rhode Island. 
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labor markets. For my sample, this level of geographical aggregation offers the best 
trade-off between the two constraints. There is evidence in the literature (Compton and 
Pollak, 2007) that young college graduates prefer large metropolitan areas and I find 
similar evidence in my data: 82% of the individuals in the sample live in a MSA in 2000. 
I include seventy-two of the largest MSAs such that all MSAs with population in excess 
of 1 million inhabitants are included (see Table 1.7 in the Appendix). In addition, if a 
particular state is not represented among the MSA-type locations, I choose the largest 
MSA in that state even if its population is less than 1 million.12 To minimize the loss of 
information I also include 47 capture-all locations consisting of the geographical area and 
population of the state left after subtracting the area and population of the MSAs used as 
standalone locations.13 This gives me 119 locations covering 47 of the American states. 
Mobility rates in the sample are high: almost 83% of individuals were living in a 
different house in 2000 than they were in 1995. For my analysis I define migration as the 
change in location over the past five years, using the above definition of locations. This 
definition of migration should be a good match for the theoretical assumption of perfect 
learning about the earnings prospects. Due to Census disclosure restrictions related to 
location size, I am unable to discern the type of move for some individuals and some 
moves will be categorized as non-migration. The Data section in the Appendix presents 
the recoding procedure in detail. These restrictions ensure that an observed move is a 
move between two well-defined labor markets. The migration rate in the final sample is 
41%. 
                                                          
12
 Except for Alaska and Rhode Island where I do not have data on the cost of living for any of the MSAs. 
13
 I exclude Hawaii, Maine and Rhone Island due to missing information on the cost of living. 
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The mean and variance of the earnings an individual expects to receive in a location 
are the central determinants of location choice in my analysis. In any dataset one may 
only observe the realization of earnings in the location the individual actually chose but 
not the earnings he would have received in every other possible location in his choice set. 
Following the literature, I assume an individual’s prior beliefs about the earnings 
distribution in a location are described by the earnings realized by similar individuals 
who actually chose that location. In particular I construct age specific earnings 
distributions for college graduates in each location using the Census person-weights. 
While I could condition on other individual characteristics (gender, race, etc), I chose the 
benefit of a more accurate earnings distribution based on a larger number of observations. 
I use the mean of the location earnings distribution to describe the mean earnings and the 
standard deviation to describe the variation of individual earnings.14 Reported earnings 
include earnings from wages, business and farm income. Often in the literature earnings 
are conditioned on employment characteristics (a minimum of hours per week and weeks 
per year worked). Since I do not model the migration-employment joint decision, I do not 
restrict the earnings distributions in this way; I assume that all earnings that are observed 
are possible outcomes for a location. An important benefit of the Census data is that it 
includes a large number of individuals, which provides a lot of information to 
characterize the earnings distribution in each location. 
                                                          
14
 I will refer to the mean of the expected earnings as “mean earnings” and to the standard deviation of 
expected earnings as the “earnings standard deviation”. I checked the sensitivity of the estimates with 
respect to different measures of earnings variation (the 95th percentile – 5th percentile, the 95th percentile – 
50th percentile) and found no substantial differences. 
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I present the characteristics of the observed earnings distributions (college graduates 
of age 23 - 27) for the top and bottom 10 locations ranked by the standard deviation of 
their earnings distribution in Table 1.2. The median earnings is on average 10% smaller 
than the mean for locations with high earnings variation, but it is almost the same for 
locations with low variation. A plot of the earnings for each location confirms that 
earnings distributions are substantially more right-skewed for locations with high 
earnings variance than for those with low variance. Figure 1.3A shows relation between 
the proportion of in-migrants in the location sample and the location’s earnings standard 
deviation. The data reveals a positive correlation between the two (correlation coefficient 
+0.32), correlation that is stronger for locations with a standard deviation below 
$25,000.This suggests that young college graduates have a preference for locations with 
high earnings variance. Figure 1.3B illustrates the classical result that locations with high 
mean earnings attract migrants. 
Previous studies have found substantial evidence that moving costs and other location 
amenities influence the location choice decision. I follow the recent estimations of 
dynamic location choice models found in Bishop (2007) and Kennan and Walker (2008) 
in choosing control variables. Both studies found large effects for moving costs, with 
fixed costs amounting to almost $300,000. I include 3 measures of moving costs: fixed 
costs, the distance between the previous location and the destination and the distance 
between the state where the individual was born and destination. Fixed costs are entered 
through indicator variables that show whether choice entails a move to another location, 
whether the destination is in the U.S. state of birth, whether the destination is located in 
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an adjacent state, and whether the destination is located in the same census division. 
Distances are measured using the Haversine formula for the Great Circle distance 
between population centroids, using the latitude and longitude information provided by 
the Census 2000 Gazetteer.15 The average migrant in my sample travelled 563 miles 
away from the origin and the destination is 585 miles from his birth state. The average 
non-migrant is only 223 miles away from the state in which he was born. I include a 
quadratic profile for distance under the assumption that marginal costs decline with 
distance, and an age profile under the assumption that the importance of moving costs 
differs by age group. Other location attributes include an indicator for MSA type 
location, population size, climatic attributes, pollution, crime levels, cost of living and the 
price of housing. Details on the construction of the control variables are found in Data 
section of the Appendix. 
5. Results 
The theoretical model predicts that a higher earnings variance increases the 
probability of choosing a location. In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate various 
implementations of the multinomial logit model with earnings standard deviation 
included as a location attribute in addition to mean earnings and other location 
characteristics. 
I start by assessing the performance of the various implementations of the 
multinomial logit with my data. First, I estimate the conditional logit (CL) model using 
                                                          
15
 See the Data section in the Appendix for details 
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the functional form described by equation (12). The best fit (constrained by 
computational limitations) specifies h(·) as a 5th order polynomial in mean earnings and 
earnings standard deviation, includes location-type specific effects, state specific effects, 
and the control variables (amenities and moving costs) described in the Data section. 
Under this setting, the individual receives identical unobserved (to the statistician) utility 
shocks in different locations belonging to the same nest and same U.S. state. For 
example, the statistician assumes that an individual would receive the same unobserved 
utility from choosing New York, NY or Rochester, NY. The CL model imposes the 
independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) restriction, which means that if New 
York City is excluded as a choice, the choice probabilities for the other 118 locations 
would change in the same proportion, irrespective of their type (MSA or Capture-all). I 
test the IIA assumption using the Hausman test: I eliminate New York City as a choice; I 
re-estimate the model with just 118 location choices; I then compare the parameter vector 
based on the restricted choice set to the one based on the full set of 119 locations. The 
test rejects the IIA restriction for my sample (chi-square statistic of 16,827), suggesting 
that a model that allows for more complex substitution patterns across locations may be a 
better choice. 
I next estimate the Nested Logit (NL) model using the functional form described by 
equation (13). The NL model relaxes some of the CL restrictions, allowing the 
unobserved utility shocks the individuals receives in two locations within the same nest 
(defined as MSA status) to be different, but correlated. For example, if the individual 
received a high utility shock in New York, NY, the statistician assumes that he will also 
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receive a high utility shock in Rochester, NY and in Columbia, SC, but no assumptions 
are made about the utility shock received from choosing a location in the rural area in the 
state of Idaho (which is defined as a capture-all location). Excluding New York City as a 
choice in this model will result in different relative changes in the choice probabilities for 
locations in different nests (although similar for all locations within a nest). The best fit 
(constrained by computational limitations) specifies h(·) as a 4th order polynomial in 
mean earnings and earnings standard deviation and includes the same control variables as 
the CL model16. The NL model offers a better fit compared to the CL model (log-
likelihood of -235,797 compared to -235,907 for the CL) and therefore seems a better 
choice for the analysis of this data. Moreover, the dissimilarity parameters are statistically 
different from one: the likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis that ρMSA = ρCapture-all = 
1 is rejected with a chi-squared statistic of 650. This evidence suggests that the utility 
shocks for locations within the same nest are correlated, and therefore the error structure 
imposed by the CL model is too restrictive for my data. 
Finally, I compare the nested logit with the random parameters logit (RPL). The RPL 
allows for tastes heterogeneity across individuals. In terms of the error components 
specification, the assumption is that shocks are correlated among all locations an 
individual can choose from, not just for locations within the same nest. For example, if 
the individual received a high utility shock in New York, NY, the statistician assumes 
that he will also receive a high utility shock in Rochester, NY (or any other MSA 
location), and in any location in the rural area in the state of Idaho (or any other capture-
                                                          
16
 An indicator for MSA type location is not included in the NL specification since it is a decision level. 
More complex specifications including 6th order polynomial terms for the CL and 5th order polynomial 
terms for the NL fail to converge. 
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all location). Excluding New York City as a choice in this model will result in different 
relative changes in the choice probabilities for all locations, irrespective of the nests they 
belong to. Computational limitations prevent me from estimating a random parameter 
model similar to the complex specification used for the nested logit. I therefore estimate 
the three models using a simpler functional form, with h(·) defined to be a 2nd order 
polynomial in mean earnings and earnings standard deviation and no state-specific 
effects. The estimated models are presented in Table 1.3. The first thing to notice is the 
very small variation in the distributions of the coefficients allowed to be random in the 
population (mean earnings, earnings standard deviation and their interactions). The 
standard deviations of the distributions range in absolute value from 0.21% to 2.42% of 
the mean of the distributions and they are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 
RPL estimates are very similar to the CL estimates and the improvement in the log-
likelihood does not warrant the inclusion of five more parameters (the standard deviations 
of the coefficient distributions). The NL model on the other hand offers a better fit than 
the RPL model and with fewer parameters, which suggests that the error structure 
assumed by the NL is more appropriate for my data. Based on this evidence, I conclude 
that the nested logit is the appropriate model for my data and perform the rest of the 
analysis using the NL with a 4th order polynomial in mean earnings and earnings standard 
deviation described above17. I later show evidence that the choice of the model has a 
lower impact on the estimated marginal effects compared to the choice of functional 
form. 
                                                          
17
 The support for this conclusion is limited by the fact that I cannot estimate a RPL with a functional form 
as complex as the NL with a 4th level polynomial in mean earnings and earnings standard deviations, and 
controls for state-specific effects. 
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I now present the marginal effects of the standard deviation of earnings and mean 
earnings on the choice probabilities. The effects are calculated using the estimates from 
the nested logit and the formulas described in the Empirical Model section18. The 
marginal effect of earnings standard deviation on the choice probability is calculated for a 
one unit ($10,000) increase in the standard deviation of the earnings distribution, while 
the standard deviations of earnings in other locations are held constant. The marginal 
effects are calculated similarly for mean earnings. A $10,000 increase is fairly 
substantial, the equivalent of moving from the 1st decile to the 9th in the distribution of 
location earnings standard deviations and similarly in the distribution of location earnings 
means19 
Figure 1.4A presents the distribution of the marginal effects (M2) representing the 
change in the proportion of individuals choosing each location in response to a $10,000 
increase in the standard deviation of earnings of the location. The effects are positive for 
101 locations out of 119 (65 of the 72 MSA-type locations). Magnitudes range from an 
11% decrease in the proportion of individuals choosing Oklahoma City, OK to a 32% 
increase for San Jose, CA, with an average of +5.4%. Further insight is available in Table 
1.4, which shows the change in the proportion of migrants for the top and bottom 10 
locations ranked by the variance of their earnings distribution. Column 1 shows that all 
locations with low earnings standard deviation would derive substantial benefits from 
increasing the variance of their earnings distribution. In the high earnings standard 
                                                          
18
 The estimates from the nested logit model used to derive the marginal effects and a comparable 
conditional logit are presented in Table 1.10 in the Appendix for completeness. 
19
 I construct a distribution of 119 earnings means and a distribution of 119 earnings standard deviations by 
pooling the moments of the earnings distributions of the 119 locations. 
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deviation group on the other hand, positive effects are limited to 6 of the 10 locations. 
More insight is available from a plot of marginal effects against the standard deviation of 
earnings. Figure 1.5 shows these plots for the MSA type locations, grouped by the mean 
of their earnings distribution. Panel (a) shows a plot of the average marginal effect 
against the earnings standard deviation of the location, for each of the 11 locations with 
mean earnings between $23,400 and $25,400.20 The graph suggests that increasing the 
standard deviation of earnings in the location while holding mean earnings constant 
(within the $23,400-25,400 range) increases the probability of choosing the location, but 
the effect falls with the standard deviation of earnings. The effects for location with 
higher mean earnings in panel (b) are larger than for locations in panel (a), given the 
same standard deviation of earnings. In other words, locations with high mean earnings 
would benefit more from increasing their standard deviation of earnings, than would 
locations with low mean earnings but equal earnings standard deviation. These two trends 
are confirmed in panels (c) through (f). Further evidence in panel (b) suggests that 
increasing the standard deviation of earnings for locations which already have high 
standard deviation of earnings (higher than $25,900 for this range of mean earnings), 
while holding mean earnings constant, would reduce the probability of choosing the 
location.21 Both trends are found in the marginal effects from the CL model presented in 
Figure 1.6 but the higher magnitudes make them somewhat less obvious. This suggests 
                                                          
20
 Ideally I would like to look at locations with the same mean earnings but different earnings standard 
deviation. In reality this is almost never observed in the data and the closest exercise is to compare 
locations with mean earnings within the same range. Looking at combinations of mean earnings and 
earnings standard deviation that are not observed in the data would add little to the analysis. 
21The exact range of the mean for which the marginal effect is positive is given by the solutions to a third 
degree equation in mean earnings, in which the coefficients depend on earnings standard deviation. Such a 
range would have to be calculated separately for each location. 
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that a certain ratio between standard deviation of earnings and mean earnings should be 
maintained in order to make the location attractive. It follows that, in order to ensure the 
highest favorable effect, increases in standard deviation of earnings should be 
accompanied by increases in mean earnings and the vice-versa. In conclusion, the data 
offers substantial evidence that locations with low to moderate earnings variance would 
always benefit from increasing the variance of their earnings distribution, given 
reasonable levels of mean earnings (i.e. comparable to those observed in this sample). For 
locations with high earnings variance, the effect depends on the specific combination of 
mean earnings and standard deviation of earnings; a positive effect requires a high 
enough level of mean earnings.  
The first three columns in Table 1.5 present the marginal effects of the standard 
deviation of earnings in terms of changes in the number of individuals choosing a certain 
location, and the composition of the in-migration flow, for the top and bottom 10 
locations ranked by the variance of their earnings distribution. The change in the number 
of individuals choosing a certain location is calculated by multiplying the average 
marginal effect (M1) for the location with the location weighted sample size.22 An 
increase in the number of individuals choosing a certain location is the result of an 
increase in the number of former residents of other locations choosing this destination 
(attracted in-migrants), plus the increase in the number of residents of the reference 
location who stay, but otherwise would have left (retained migrants). The change in the 
number of attracted in-migrants is calculated by multiplying the average marginal effect 
                                                          
22
 I use the weighted sample to give a more realistic sense of the magnitude of the effect. Quantitative 
predictions based on the un-weighted sample are not very interesting from a policy-making perspective. 
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(M1) for this group with the number of individuals in the sample who used to reside in 
some other location in 1995. Similarly, the number of retained migrants is calculated by 
multiplying the average marginal effect (M1) for this group with the number of 
individuals who resided in the reference location in 1995. For example, 1,759 more 
individuals would choose Louisville, KY in 2000 following a $10,000 increase in the 
standard deviation of earnings in Louisville. Most of them (1,355) are new migrants who 
lived somewhere other than in Louisville in 1995, and without the increase in the 
standard deviation of earnings would have chosen some other location instead of 
Louisville. The rest (404) are individuals who resided in Louisville in 1995 and who, 
without the increase, would have left in 2000. In the high variance group, 2,024 young 
college graduates who had chosen Los Angeles in 2000 would choose another location 
following the $10,000 increase in the standard deviation of earnings. Most of them 
(1,578) are potential migrants who did not reside in Los Angeles in 1995 and who, 
because of the increase, would choose another location than Los Angeles. The rest (446) 
are individuals who resided in Los Angeles in 1995 but would choose to leave in 2000 
following the increase in the standard deviation of earnings. It is also interesting to note 
that the effect is always stronger on potential in-migrants than on residents. 
The changes in the proportion of individuals choosing a location following a $10,000 
increase in the mean of the earnings distribution of the location are presented in Figure 
1.4B. The effects are positive for 117 locations out of 119 (70 out of the 72 MSA-type 
locations). Magnitudes range from a 71% decrease in the proportion of individuals 
choosing San Jose, CA to a 41% increase for Fort Lauderdale, FL, with an average of 
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+16.7%. Column 2 in Table 1.4 shows consistently positive effects for the 10 locations 
with lowest earnings variance and positive effects for 8 out of the 10 locations with the 
highest earnings variance. Overall, the effects in terms of population presented in 
columns 4-6 in Table 1.5 are substantial but we have to remember that these are two-
period effects (the effect on the linear, first period term and the effect on the option value 
term) and they should be seen as an upper limit.23 Again, in most cases, the effect is 
consistently stronger on potential in-migrants than on residents. In conclusion there is 
strong evidence that increasing the mean of the earnings distribution will increase the 
ability of most locations to attract young college graduates in their labor supply. 
An interesting issue to be addressed, given the computational limitations of 
estimating the nested logit and the random parameter logit, is how the size and sign of the 
marginal effects change with different choices of model or functional form. The marginal 
effects from the nested logit presented in Figure 1.5 are quite different from those implied 
by the conditional logit in Figure 1.6. The magnitudes are higher for the CL model given 
the same earnings standard deviation and range of mean earnings, and there are more 
negative effects. The question that arises is whether the change in functional form from a 
4th order polynomial to a 5th order is driving these differences or is the change from the 
error structure imposed by the nested logit to the one imposed by the conditional logit. 
Table 1.11 in the Appendix shows a comparison between the marginal effects of earnings 
standard deviation (for MSA type locations only) implied by the nested logit used as the 
benchmark model (NL 4), a comparable conditional logit (CL 4, including a 4th order 
                                                          
23
 See footnote 8.  
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polynomial in mean earnings and earnings standard deviation) and the best fitting 
conditional logit (CL 5, including a 5th order polynomial). All models include the same 
control variables (except for the MSA status indicator, excluded from the nested logit). 
The marginal effects implied by the NL 4 and the CL 4 models are fairly similar, but the 
NL 4 shows less variation across locations. On the contrary, the CL 5 model shows 
marginal effects that differ substantially both in magnitude and in sign compared to CL 4. 
Table 1.12 in the Appendix shows a similar comparison between marginal effects of 
mean earnings. The effects implied by the CL 4 model are consistently higher than those 
implied by the NL 4, almost suggesting a scale difference (about 100% higher in most 
cases). The CL 5 model shows effects that are either higher or lower than those implied 
by the CL 4 model and sometimes of different sign. I interpret this evidence to suggest 
that the choice of functional form has a greater impact on the size and sign of the 
marginal effects than does the choice of the model.24  
I also calculate marginal cross-effects on the probability of choosing each location 
following a $10,000 increase in the earnings standard deviation (mean earnings) in 
Columbia, SC. Table 1.6 shows the number of individuals changing their destination to 
Columbia, SC in 2000 as a result of this increase. The effects are small but more 
substantial on average than for locations with high earnings variance. For example New 
YorkCity would lose 63 individuals who choose Columbia in 2000. Approximately two 
thirds are residents of other locations in 1995 who would have chosen New York City in 
                                                          
24
 Following this reasoning I do not expect marginal effects coming from a nested logit using a different 
nesting structure to be very different compared to those implied by a nested logit using a 5th order 
polynomial in mean earnings and earnings standard deviation. A nested logit with locations nested in U.S. 
states cannot be estimated due to computational limitations. 
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2000, but now choose Columbia following the increase in the earnings standard deviation 
in Columbia. The remaining one third are 1995 New York City residents who would 
leave New York City and choose to move to Columbia in 2000. The same pattern 
emerges in the last three columns of Table 1.6 where I present the results of a one unit 
($10,000) increase in the mean of the earnings distribution for Columbia, SC, on the 
number of individuals choosing other locations. To summarize, evidence suggests that 
increasing the variance of the earnings distribution for locations with low earnings 
variance attracts migrants who would have otherwise chosen other locations, and 
especially migrants who would have chosen locations with high earnings variance. 
The estimated coefficients of the control variables are presented in Table 1.10 in the 
Appendix; most have the expected sign, with a few exceptions. Moving to a destination 
further away from the origin is increasingly costly up to 1,500 miles; the effect is then 
decreasing in distance up to approximately 3300 miles, and then turns positive.25 The age 
profile suggests that moving to a more remote destination becomes less expensive with 
age but the age effect is very small. Moving to a destination further away from the state 
of birth is increasingly costly up to 1,500 or 2,000 miles (1,500 for individuals of age 24-
27 and 2,000 for age 23); the effect is then decreasing in distance up to approximately 
3,500 miles for the 27 years old and 4750 for the 23 years old, and then turns positive.26 
The age profile suggests that moving to a destination further away from the birth state is 
less expensive for younger individuals. Individuals are more likely to choose a location in 
                                                          
25
 Approx. 99.8% of the moving distances recorded for actual migrants are less than 3000 miles. Only 46 
individuals out of 113,834 moved to a location further away than 3000 miles. 
26
 Approx. 99.9% of the distances from the state of birth recorded for actual migrants are less than 3500 
miles. Only 62 individuals out of 113,834 moved to a location further away from the birth state by more 
than 3500 miles. 
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the state where they were born and locations situated within the same census division, but 
less likely to choose a location in an adjacent state. An explanation for the latter effect is 
that for shorter distances, migration may be replaced by commutes. Young college 
graduates seem to prefer locations that have mild weather, a larger population size, low 
levels of crime and low cost of living. The effect of population size is even more 
important when choosing an MSA than when choosing a capture-all location. The 
coefficient on the measure of pollution is counterintuitive, but it may have to do with the 
preference of young college graduates for MSAs, which are also consistently more 
polluted than capture-all locations. The positive effect of the housing price on the 
probability of choosing a location suggests that this price may be measuring some 
location amenities other than the cost of living (see Roback, 1982). 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper I have developed a dynamic model of location choice for young college 
graduates, which predicts that individuals who are uncertain about their earnings 
prospects will choose the location with the highest earnings variance as their first 
destination, everything else equal. Choosing a location entails gains if the earnings 
realization is higher than expected or a loss it the opposite is true. The gains may be 
exploited for a lifetime while the loss can be limited to one period by moving to another 
location in the next period. As a result, the expected second period payoff is limited from 
below at the mean utility of the next best alternative. In this sense we can talk about an 
“option value” of a location, an attribute that is more valuable the higher are the earnings 
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opportunities associated with the location. The “option value” can be approximated by 
the variance of the earnings distribution since only the upper tail is relevant for the 
migration decision. 
Using a large sample of young college graduates from the 5% sample of the 2000 
U.S. Census, I find evidence that locations with low to moderate earnings variance can 
enhance their ability to attract young college graduates by increasing the variance of their 
earnings distribution. For locations with high earnings variance, the effect of increasing 
the variance of earnings on their choice probability depends on the specific combination 
of mean earnings and earnings standard deviation; a positive effect requires a high 
enough level of mean earnings. To ensure the highest favorable effect, increases in 
earnings standard deviation should be accompanied by increases in mean earnings and 
vice-versa. Increasing the variance of the earnings distribution for locations which benefit 
from this change has a negative effect of the probability of choosing other locations and 
the effect is stronger on locations which already have high earnings variance. From a 
policy making perspective, using earnings variance as a policy variable to attract young 
college graduates is an interesting proposition: increasing earnings variance may be 
achieved by simply attracting businesses with a high level of risk, and may therefore 
require far less resources than increasing the mean of the earnings distribution or 
improving other location amenities. 
Estimates from the random parameters logit model suggest that preferences for mean 
earnings and earnings variance show very little variation across individuals in my sample. 
This may be the result of a homogeneous sample, but it must be carefully interpreted due 
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to the fact that computational limitations do not allow me to estimate a random 
parameters model with a comparably complex functional form as the one used for the 
nested logit. Additional evidence from the implementations of the conditional logit and 
the nested logit suggest that the choice of functional form has a greater impact on the sign 
and the size of the marginal effects than the choice of the model does. In light of this 
finding, concerns over the choice of the model may be exaggerated in the literature and 
more care should be devoted to the choice of functional form. 
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for the estimation sample 
Characteristic All Migrants Non-migrants 
Age 25.2 (1.38) 25.2 (1.36) 25.2 (1.40) 
Male 0.42 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 
White 0.88 (0.32) 0.89 (0.31) 0.88 (0.33) 
Graduate degree 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35) 0.11 (0.31) 
Earned income, previous year 28.5 (22.4) 30.4 (23.6) 27.2 (21.4) 
Usual hours of work, previous year 40.1 (12.7) 41.2 (12.8) 39.3 (12.6) 
Weeks of work, previous year 43.8 (14.1) 44.1 (13.6) 43.6 (14.5) 
Sample size 113,834 46,751 67,083 
Note: Standard Deviation in parentheses 
 
Table 1.2: Earnings distributions for the Top/Bottom 10 MSA-type locations by variance of the 
earnings distribution 
Location name Std Dev ($1,000s) 
Mean 
($1,000s) 
5th 
($1,000s) 
50th 
($1,000s) 
Max 
($1,000s) 
Top 10      
Fort Lauderdale, FL 37.5 31.2 0.0 28.0 585.0 
San Jose, CA 35.6 44.6 4.0 40.0 325.0 
New York, NY 34.5 36.1 1.0 32.0 357.0 
San Francisco, CA 32.5 38.2 4.0 33.1 355.0 
Oklahoma City, OK 32.7 25.9 0.0 22.0 318.0 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 28.7 31.7 1.0 29.0 576.0 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 28.0 27.0 1.4 24.0 321.0 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 26.2 30.0 2.7 27.0 336.0 
Miami, FL 26.8 27.7 0.0 27.0 320.0 
Sacramento, CA 26.8 29.8 2.9 27.0 315.0 
Average for Top 10 31.0 33.1 1.4 29.8 426.0 
Bottom 10      
Boise City, ID 15.3 23.7 0.0 22.8 90.0 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, 
MI 14.8 27.8 3.2 28.0 80.0 
Madison, WI 14.7 24.7 3.6 24.3 135.0 
Jackson, MS 14.6 24.7 1.0 24.2 100.0 
Louisville, KY-IN 14.4 27.1 7.0 26.0 112.8 
Fresno, CA 14.4 24.3 0.0 25.2 71.0 
Columbia, SC 14.3 25.4 2.9 24.7 84.0 
Des Moines, IA 14.1 28.1 3.5 28.5 116.0 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport 
News, VA-NC 13.8 23.4 0.8 23.0 110.0 
Omaha, NE-IA 13.9 26.2 1.6 26.0 92.0 
Average for Bottom 10 14.3 25.5 2.4 25.2 97.9 
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Table 1.3: Estimated coefficients for comparable specifications of the Nested Logit (NL), 
Conditional Logit(CL) and Random Parameters Logit (RPL) models 
Independent variable Model 
NL CL RPL 
(Mean of) Coefficient on mean earnings 
($10,000) – αM  0.926** (0.060) 1.264** (0.070) 1.264** (0.070) 
Standard Deviation of αM  -  -  0.005   (0.036) 
(Mean of) Coefficient on earnings 
standard deviation ($10,000) - αS  0.118** (0.041) 0.136** (0.047) 0.136** (0.047) 
Standard Deviation of αS  -  - -0.003   (0.027) 
 (Mean of) Coefficient on M x S - αMS 0.182** (0.019) 0.187** (0.022) 0.187** (0.022) 
Standard Deviation of αMS  -  - -4.0E-4   (0.005) 
 (Mean of) Coefficient on M2 - αMM -0.204** (0.015) -0.247** (0.017) -0.247** (0.017) 
Standard Deviation of αMM  -  - 7.0E-4   (0.005) 
 (Mean of) Coefficient on S2 - αSS -0.124** (0.008) -0.133** (0.009) -0.133** (0.009) 
Standard Deviation of αSS -   - 0.001   (0.005) 
Fixed cost of moving -2.077** (0.015) -2.327** (0.011) -2.327** (0.011) 
Distance Origin to Destination (th. mi) -3.728** (0.319) -4.637** (0.371) -4.638** (0.371) 
Distance Origin to Destination, Sq. 1.145** (0.142) 1.426** (0.166) 1.427** (0.166) 
Distance Birthplace to Destination (th. mi) 1.277** (0.347) 1.688** (0.411) 1.690** (0.411) 
Distance Birthplace to Destination, Sq.  -0.604** (0.147) -0.780** (0.174) -0.781** (0.174) 
D-o-D x Age 0.047** (0.012) 0.061** (0.015) 0.061** (0.015) 
D-o-D-sq x Age -0.015** (0.006) -0.019** (0.007) -0.020** (0.007) 
D-o-B x Age -0.067** (0.014) -0.084** (0.016) -0.084** (0.016) 
D-o-B-sq x Age 0.028** (0.006) 0.035** (0.007) 0.035** (0.007) 
Destination is in the birth state 1.220** (0.013) 1.447** (0.013) 1.447** (0.013) 
Destination is in adjacent state -0.085** (0.009) -0.105** (0.011) -0.105** (0.011) 
Destination is in same census division 0.542** (0.012) 0.657** (0.013) 0.657** (0.013) 
Destination is MSA-type -  -0.433** (0.020) -0.433** (0.020) 
Cooling degrees-day (5 deg./day, all year) 0.212** (0.017) 0.220** (0.020) 0.220** (0.020) 
Heating degrees-day (5 deg./day, all year) -0.085** (0.008) -0.112** (0.009) -0.112** (0.009) 
Population (tens of th) 0.002** (1.8E-4) 0.001** (2.3E-4) 0.001** (2.0E-4) 
x MSA indicator 0.016** (2.5E-4) 0.021** (3.1E-4) 0.021** (3.0E-4) 
Crime Index -0.015** (0.001) -0.001   (0.002) -0.001   (0.002) 
Pollution -0.084** (0.007) -0.082** (0.009) -0.082** (0.009) 
NAR Median Homes Price 0.041** (9.6E-4) 0.051** (0.001) 0.051** (0.001) 
ACCRA Cost of Living Index -0.427** (0.017) -0.566** (0.020) -0.566** (0.020) 
State Fixed Effects No No No 
Log-likelihood: -238,895.90 -238,953.05 -238,953.00 
Sample size: 113,834 113,834 113,834 
Number of coefficients: 25 26 26 
Number of parameters: 27 26 31 
Notes:  coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses 
** denotes significance at 1% or better; * is significant at 5% or better 
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Table 1.4: Percentage change in the proportion of individuals choosing one of the Top/Bottom 
10 locations by earnings variance, as a result of a $10,000 increase in the Standard 
Deviation/Mean of the location’s earnings distribution 
Location name Effect of Earnings 
Std Dev 
Effect of Mean 
Earnings 
Top 10   
Fort Lauderdale, FL -7.4% 41.2% 
San Jose, CA 31.8% -70.5% 
New York, NY 2.8% 8.6% 
San Francisco, CA 4.7% -5.5% 
Oklahoma City, OK -11.3% 31.7% 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
CA -4.3% 22.2% 
Little Rock-North Little 
Rock, AR 1.4% 27.7% 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, 
WA -2.7% 23.7% 
Miami, FL 1.3% 24.0% 
Sacramento, CA 3.5% 25.4% 
Bottom 10   
Boise City, ID 5.6% 26.1% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-
Holland, MI 19.0% 15.8% 
Madison, WI 12.0% 20.2% 
Jackson, MS 9.5% 25.6% 
Louisville, KY-IN 18.6% 16.4% 
Fresno, CA 7.7% 25.6% 
Columbia, SC 15.7% 16.7% 
Des Moines, IA 22.5% 14.3% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC 11.1% 19.9% 
Omaha, NE-IA 18.5% 17.8% 
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Table 1.5: Change in the number of individuals choosing one of the Top/Bottom 10 locations by 
earnings variance as a result of a $10,000 increase in the Standard Deviation/Mean of the 
location’s earnings distribution 
Location name 
Effect of increasing the Std Dev Effect of increasing the Mean 
Pop. 
change 
New In-
migrants 
Retained 
Residents 
Pop. 
change 
New In-
migrants 
Retained 
Residents 
Top 10       
Fort Lauderdale, FL -661 -510 -151 3,649 2,886 763 
San Jose, CA 5,332 4,065 1,267 -11,687 -8,930 -2,757 
New York, NY 2,197 1,234 963 8,431 5,447 2,984 
San Francisco, CA 1,246 719 527 -1,586 -721 -865 
Oklahoma City, OK -396 -311 -85 1,107 872 235 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
CA -2,024 -1,578 -446 10,036 7,756 2,280 
Little Rock-North Little 
Rock, AR 93 65 28 1,227 835 392 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, 
WA -439 -333 -106 3,898 2,984 914 
Miami, FL 180 176 4 1,837 1,435 402 
Sacramento, CA 215 142 73 1,621 1,111 510 
Bottom 10       
Boise City, ID 172 122 50 573 428 145 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-
Holland, MI 1,416 856 560 1,214 751 463 
Madison, WI 932 512 420 1,479 910 569 
Jackson, MS 571 393 178 1,070 740 330 
Louisville, KY-IN 1,759 1,355 404 1,582 1,236 346 
Fresno, CA 606 458 148 1,323 1,005 318 
Columbia, SC 1,230 884 346 1,321 955 366 
Des Moines, IA 1,000 743 257 639 499 140 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC 1,045 678 367 2,050 1,333 717 
Omaha, NE-IA 775 473 302 769 472 297 
Note:Estimates based on the 1995 location population, using the weighted sample 
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Table 1.6: Change in the number of individuals choosing a location as a result of a $10,000 
increase in the Standard Deviation/Mean of the earnings distribution of Columbia, SC 
Location name 
Effect of Std Dev Effect of Mean 
Pop. 
change 
New In-
migrants 
Retained 
Residents 
Pop. 
change 
New In-
migrants 
Retained 
Residents 
Top 10       
Fort Lauderdale, FL -18 -15 -3 -19 -16 -3 
San Jose, CA -11 -10 -1 -13 -12 -1 
New York, NY -63 -46 -17 -68 -49 -19 
San Francisco, CA -13 -11 -2 -13 -11 -2 
Oklahoma City, OK -3 -3 0 -3 -3 0 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
CA -23 -21 -2 -24 -22 -2 
Little Rock-North Little 
Rock, AR -5 -4 -1 -5 -4 -1 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, 
WA -14 -13 -1 -15 -14 -1 
Miami, FL -15 -13 -2 -16 -14 -2 
Sacramento, CA -3 -3 0 -3 -3 0 
Bottom 10       
Boise City, ID -2 -2 0 -2 -2 0 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-
Holland, MI -6 -4 -2 -6 -4 -2 
Madison, WI -5 -3 -2 -5 -4 -1 
Jackson, MS -6 -5 -1 -6 -5 -1 
Louisville, KY-IN -12 -10 -2 -13 -11 -2 
Fresno, CA -2 -2 0 -2 -2 0 
Columbia, SC - - - - - - 
Des Moines, IA -3 -2 -1 -4 -3 -1 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC -20 -13 -7 -22 -15 -7 
Omaha, NE-IA -3 -2 -1 -3 -2 -1 
Note:Estimates based on the 1995 location population, using the weighted sample  
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Figure 1.1: Location choice decision timing 
Note: “A” denotes Agent; “N” denotes Nature. The Agent’s payoffs are shown. 
Figure 1.2: Proportion of college graduates in sample who live in a different PUMA in 2000 than 
in 1995, by age 
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Figure 1.3A: Proportion of in-migrants in the location sample and the standard deviation of the 
location earnings distribution 
 
Figure 1.3B: Proportion of in-migrants in the location sample and the mean of the location 
earnings distribution 
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Figure 1.4A: Distribution of marginal effects (M2) on choice probabilities resulting from a 
$10,000 increase in the Standard Deviation of the location’s earnings distribution 
 
Figure 1.4B: Distribution of marginal effects (M2) on choice probabilities resulting from a 
$10,000 increase in the Mean of the location’s earnings distribution 
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Figure 1.5: Marginal effects (M2) of Earnings Standard Deviation by range of Mean Earnings, 
for MSA type locations; Estimates from a Nested Logit with a 4th order polynomial in mean 
earnings and earnings standard deviation. 
 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
10 20 30 40
Ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e p
rop
ort
ion
 of
 in
div
idu
als
 
ch
oo
sin
g t
he
 lo
cat
ion
Earnings Standard Deviation ($1,000)
a) Mean earnings $23,400-25,400
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
10 20 30 40
Ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e p
rop
ort
ion
 of
 in
div
idu
als
 
ch
oo
sin
g t
he
 lo
cat
ion
Earnings Standard Deviation ($1,000)
b) Mean earnings $25,500-26,700
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
10 20 30 40
Ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e p
rop
ort
ion
 of
 in
div
idu
als
 
ch
oo
sin
g t
he
 lo
cat
ion
Earnings Standard Deviation ($1,000)
c) Mean earnings $26,800-27,800
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
10 20 30 40
Ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e p
rop
ort
ion
 of
 in
div
idu
als
 
ch
oo
sin
g t
he
 lo
cat
ion
Earnings Standard Deviation ($1,000)
d) Mean earnings $27,900-29,300
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
10 20 30 40
Ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e p
rop
ort
ion
 of
 in
div
idu
als
 
ch
oo
sin
g t
he
 lo
cat
ion
Earnings Standard Deviation ($1,000)
e) Mean earnings $29,400-31,200
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
10 20 30 40
Ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e p
rop
ort
ion
 of
 in
div
idu
als
 
ch
oo
sin
g t
he
 lo
cat
ion
Earnings Standard Deviation ($1,000)
f) Mean earnings $31,300-44,600
 51 
 
Figure 1.6: Marginal effects (M2) of Earnings Standard Deviation by range of Mean Earnings, 
for MSA type locations; Estimates from a Conditional Logit with a 5th order polynomial in mean 
earnings and earnings standard deviation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A SEMI-NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACH TO THE ESTIMATION OF THE 
DEMAND FOR HOUSING SERVICES 
1. Introduction 
Owner-occupied housing is a good that offers both consumption and investment 
services to homeowners. For most homeowners, the house is the single largest asset in 
household’s investment portfolio, even if most owners do not acknowledge it every day. 
The investment aspect of housing becomes important when households plan to relocate or 
decide to invest additional savings and future cash flows. We would assume a rational 
household gathers information on the return and risk of various assets before making a 
decision. It is reasonable to assume that current price evolutions in the housing market 
will bear significant weight in updating the household’s expectations about the return to 
housing investment. Additionally, if liquidity constraints are low, it may be easy for 
expectations to become reality and fuel higher expectations. If this effect is strong 
enough, it may overwhelm the classical negative effect of price on quantity related to the 
consumption nature of the housing good. What we would observe then is an increase in 
the housing market price but also an increase in the quantity of housing demanded. 
In neoclassical economic theory, such a relationship between price and quantity is 
only possible for inferior goods, which housing is most likely not. However, Dusansky 
and Wilson (1993) develop a dynamic model under uncertainty which provides the 
theoretical foundations for an upward sloping, compensated demand curve for non-
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inferior goods. I present a simplified version of the model to show that the slope of the 
compensated (and uncompensated) demand for housing services may be positive or 
negative without any restrictions imposed on the income effect. I then use a two-step 
procedure to test the theoretical implication using data from the American Community 
Survey for the year 2007. In the first step I estimate hedonic regressions to retrieve the 
implicit prices of housing characteristics using the Fourier semi-non-parametric series 
estimator. I use the implicit prices to construct the price per unit of housing services as 
the value of a standardized housing unit in every housing market. I then extract the 
quantity of housing services and estimate the uncompensated demand for owner-occupied 
housing services while controlling for sample selection bias. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is the use of the semi-non-parametric 
Fourier series estimator to identify the hedonic price functions. Several papers in the 
literature on demand for housing characteristics have noted that, the estimates for demand 
elasticities obtained in the second stage depend closely on the functional form used in the 
first stage. Estimates have been found to vary by a factor of 2-4 for the price elasticity 
and 9-18 for the income elasticity. Two previous studies in the literature on demand for 
housing services have found conflicting estimates of the effect of price on the quantity of 
owner-occupied housing services: Rapaport (1997) finds a negative effect using a linear 
specification for the hedonic functions and data on five housing markets from Florida; 
Dusansky and Koc (2007) find a positive effect using the Box-Cox transformation of the 
dependent variable and data on different markets from Florida. Three factors could 
determine these differences: the estimation method used for the hedonic functions, the 
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data, and the model used to estimate the demand equation. Rapaport (1997) shows that 
the choice of model used to estimate demand for housing services in the second step has a 
substantial impact on the estimated effect of the price. An equally important question is: 
are these differences an artifact of using different estimation methods for the hedonic 
functions? Using a less restrictive estimator for the hedonic functions, the semi-non-
parametric Fourier series estimator may provide an answer to this question. I find that 
changing the estimation method for the hedonic functions leads to differences in the 
estimated slope of the demand, but the estimation technique alone cannot explain the 
large differences found in the literature. Further evidence suggests that the popular Box-
Cox model used in the literature may be overly restrictive for estimating housing hedonic 
functions. The second question I address is whether there is evidence in the data of an 
asset appreciation effect of the price of owner-occupied housing services on the quantity 
of owner-occupied housing services demanded. I find a negative effect of the price on the 
quantity demanded, under the assumption of homogenous preferences across housing 
markets in the U.S. There are substantial differences in the effects of price across U.S. 
states, but all except one are negative. When I relax the homogeneity assumption and 
allow for state specific effects, I find evidence consistent with an asset appreciation effect 
in about half of the U.S. states. 
2. Literature Review 
The modern housing literature extends in three directions: the tenure choice, the 
demand for housing characteristics and the demand for housing services. Recently, more 
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often the tenure choice is modeled jointly with the demand for housing services. The 
theoretical foundations for estimating the demand for housing characteristics have been 
laid in Rosen (1974)’s theory of implicit prices. The implicit prices are either the object 
of interest in analyzing the demand for a certain housing characteristic or, more often, an 
intermediary step in estimating the demand for housing services. 
Most theoretical models in the literature on the demand for housing services are static 
models focusing on the consumption aspect of the housing good. The dynamic approach 
recognizes the dual nature of the housing good: consumption and investment. Henderson 
and Ioannides (1983) develop one of the few dynamic models explaining the tenure 
choice decision, but they do not address the quantity of housing demanded. Dusansky and 
Wilson (1993) develop a dynamic model of housing demand under uncertainty about 
future prices. Using a firm mathematical foundation they show that without specific 
restrictions on the form of the utility function, the demand for housing services may 
exhibit only a few or none of the classical properties (symmetry, negative semi-
definiteness) of demand. Without these restrictions, non-inferiority is no longer enough to 
guarantee a downward sloping compensated (and uncompensated) demand curve, and 
demand may actually be upward sloping. Their result is driven by the investment nature 
of the housing good and the mechanism through which current prices forecast future 
prices. 
The empirical estimation of the demand for housing characteristics and the demand 
for housing services requires a two-step procedure due to the heterogeneous nature of the 
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housing good.27 In the first step a hedonic regression is used to extract the implicit prices 
of housing characteristics. The estimation of the demand curve for a characteristic 
implies a second step in which the amount of the characteristic is regressed on a 
transformation of the implicit price, the implicit price of other characteristics and other 
variables of interest. In the estimation of the demand curve for housing services, the 
second stage of the analysis uses the hedonic prices to calculate the price per unit of 
housing services, then extract the number of units of housing services and finally estimate 
the inverse uncompensated demand for housing services. 
In the literature on the estimation of the demand for housing characteristics, Bender et 
al. (1980) analyze the impact of the functional form used in the hedonic equation on the 
estimates of price and income elasticity of demand for clean air. A comparison among the 
quadratic Box-Cox with interactions, the Box-Cox, the linear and the log-linear forms for 
the hedonic function shows that estimates for the price elasticity of demand for clean air 
may be overstated by a factor of 2-4 and 9-18 for the income elasticity. The linear, log-
linear and Box-Cox specifications are strongly rejected as overly restrictive against the 
quadratic Box-Cox. Their findings suggest that the functional form of the hedonic 
function will play an important role for the estimates obtained in the second stage.  
In the literature on the estimation of demand for housing services, Rappaport (1997), 
Zabel (2004) and Dusansky and Koc (2007) are representative among many other studies. 
Rapaport (1997) develops an econometric model for the joint decision of community 
choice, tenure choice, and demand for housing services. In the first step of her analysis, a 
                                                          
27
 Follain and Jimenez (1985) give an overview of the empirical methods used in the literature and assess 
the two approaches to the estimation of housing demand: housing as a composite commodity and the 
housing characteristics approach. 
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price index for a constant quality house is calculated for all markets and then used to 
extract the quantity of housing services. In the second step, the demand for housing 
services is estimated while controlling for selection bias. Using data from Florida, she 
finds a negative effect of price on the quantity of owner-occupied housing services. 
Further, controlling for selection bias arising from the household’s choice of 
neighborhood and tenure increases the estimated price elasticity of demand, compared to 
a model that controls for the tenure choice only and a model with no control for sample 
selection bias. Zabel (2004) follows a similar empirical procedure for the first step but 
allows the hedonic functions to be different across markets. Dusansky and Koc (2007) 
take a similar approach but use the Box-Cox functional form for the hedonic function. 
Using data from five housing markets in Florida they find a positive effect of price on the 
quantity of owner-occupied housing. The opposing effects found by Rapaport (1997) and 
Dusansky and Koc (2007) may be due to different functional forms used for the hedonic 
functions, or to differences in the housing markets the two studies cover. 
The importance of the functional form for the estimation of the hedonic function has 
been recently emphasized by the use of non-parametric methods by Mason and Quigley 
(1996), and McMillen and Redfearn (2010). Using data from Los Angeles for the period 
1980-1991, Mason and Quigley (1996) find that the General Additive Model offers a 
better fit than the semi log-linear specification. McMillen and Redfearn (2010) assess the 
performance of non-parametric methods against parametric methods and review the 
statistical inference tools available for the non-parametric techniques. A Monte Carlo 
experiment using three different functional forms — linear ordinary least squares (OLS), 
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OLS with fixed effects and the locally weighted linear regression (LWR) — shows that 
estimates of the effect of distance on the price of the house are sensitive to functional 
form specification. They find that LWR achieves the same fit as the OLS with fixed 
effects, but with significantly fewer restrictions imposed on the functional form. This 
makes the LWR is a good choice for fitting spatial data, especially when the true 
functional form is unknown. 
To summarize, there is no consensus in the literature on which estimation method is 
appropriate for the housing hedonic functions, with recent evidence pointing towards 
more complex linear forms (the Box-Cox) and non-parametric methods. An important 
question that remains unanswered is whether different estimates for the slope of the 
demand for housing services are generated by different methods of estimation used for 
the hedonic functions in the first stage, and this is the main question of the paper. 
3. Theoretical Model 
This section presents a simplified version of the dynamic model developed in 
Dusansky and Wilson (1993). The original model is built on two important assumptions: 
housing represents both consumption and investment; consumers are uncertain about 
future prices but they use current prices to predict future prices. This link between current 
and future prices entails an additional effect of current price on current 
consumption/investment of owner-occupied housing. Specifically, buying more housing 
today also increases the investment in the housing asset and results in higher revenue in 
the second period, for any price per unit of owner-occupied housing. Under these 
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assumptions, the current price has two opposing effects on the quantity of owner-
occupied housing: the negative effect implied by substitution but also the positive effect 
derived from the increase in the return on investment in the second period. 
Assume a two period model in which individuals live in owner-occupied housing in 
the first period and in rental-occupied housing in the second period. The individual 
derives utility from the consumption good x and owner-occupied housing ho in the first 
period, and x and rental occupied housing hr in the second period, 
 
1 1 2 2( , , , )o rU U x h x h=
 
(1) 
where the subscripts denote the period in which consumption take place. It is assumed 
that the individual is a price taker and his actions do not influence the market price. In the 
first period the individual purchases consumption of good x and owner-occupied housing 
ho such that the following budget constraint is satisfied: 
1 1 1 1 1
o op x p h Y⋅ + ⋅ =
 
(2) 
where p1 is the price per unit of consumption good x in period 1, x1 is the consumption of 
good x in period 1, 1op is the price per unit of owner-occupied housing in period 1, 1oh is 
the stock of owner-occupied housing purchased in the first period, and Y1 is the income 
earned in period 1. No borrowing or other form of savings is allowed; housing is the only 
inter-temporal store of value. At the beginning of the second period, the individual sells 
the owner-occupied housing stock and uses the revenue to purchase consumption good x 
and rental-occupied housing hr. With no bequests, the budget constraint for the second 
period is given by 
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2 2 2 2 2 1 2
r r o op x p h p h Y⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ +
 
(3) 
where p2 is the price per unit of consumption good x in period 2, x2 is the consumption of 
good x in period 2, 2rp is the price per unit of rental-occupied housing in period 2, 2rh is 
the consumption of rental-occupied housing in the second period, 2op is the price per unit 
of owner-occupied housing in period 2, 1oh is defined as above, and Y2 is the income 
earned in period 2. 
Under perfect information, the individual would maximize utility given by equation 
(1) subject to the budget constraints (2) and (3). It is important to note that the decision 
made in period 1 has consequences for the budget constraint in period 2, through 1oh . 
Different bundles of current consumption (x1, 1oh ) affect the level of income available in 
the second period. In turn this will affect the consumption bundle in the second period, 
(x2, 2rh ). For any given Y2 then, the solution ( * * * *1 1 2 2, , ,o rx h x h ) to the two-period 
maximization problem is determined by the triple (x1, 1oh ,P2), where P2 = ( 2 2 2, ,o rp p p ) is 
the price system in the second period.28 The problem is more complex if the price system 
P2 is unknown in the first period, as the individual needs to maximize the expected utility 
over all possible future price systems. Assuming that P2 can be forecast using information 
on P1 = ( 1 1 1, ,o rp p p ), the price system from the first time period, the problem reduces to 
maximizing: 
( )
2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1( , , ) ( , , ) |o o
P
V x h P U x h P dF P P= ⋅∫
 
(4) 
                                                          
28
 See Dusansky and Wilson (1993) for a mathematical proof of the argument. 
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with respect to the first period budget constraint given in Equation (2). V(•) is the 
expected utility function of the consumption decision (x1, 1oh ) made under the price 
system P1. F(P2|P1) is the marginal distribution of the price system in period 2 given the 
price system in period 1 and the integration is taken over the range of P2 .29 The 
Lagrangian for this problem is given by 
( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , )o o oL V x h P Y p x p hλ= + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
 
(5) 
The first order conditions are given by: 
1
1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1
0
0o
x
o
h
o o
V p
V p
Y p x p h
λ
λ
− ⋅ =
− ⋅ =
− ⋅ − ⋅
 
(6) 
where: 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( , , ) ( , , )
, o
o o
x oh
V x h P V x h PV V
x h
∂ ∂= =
∂ ∂
 
 
Assuming that the second order conditions are satisfied, we obtain the demand functions 
for the consumption good and for owner-occupied housing: 
( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
,
,
o
x x P Y
h h P Y
=
=
 
(7) 
A notable difference between this setting and the two-period maximization problem 
under certainty is the fact that price system from period 2, P2 does not show explicitly in 
the arguments of x(•) and h(•). The impact of the future price changes on the current 
demand is completely channeled through the updating mechanism described by F(P2|P1).  
                                                          
29
 Dusansky and Wilson (1993) discuss extensively the updating mechanism and offer a formal proof for 
the continuity of this function. 
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The second order conditions imply the following comparative statics: 
1 1 1 11 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
0
0
0 1
o o
o o o o o o
o
x x x px h x p
o o o
o
ox h h h h p h p
o o
o
x x x
p p YV V p V V
h h hV V p V V
p p Y
p p x h
p p Y
λ
λ
λ λ λ
∂ ∂ ∂  ∂ ∂ ∂− − −        ∂ ∂ ∂− ⋅ = − −    ∂ ∂ ∂    − − −    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
(8) 
where Vab is the second derivative of V(•) with respect to its arguments a and b. Using 
Cramer’s Rule we can solve for the slope of the uncompensated demand curve: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 11 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 11 11
1
o o o o
o o o oo
x xo x p h p x h
p p p h p hp ph V V V V
p H H H H H
λ
⋅ ⋅ ⋅∂ = − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅
∂
 
(9) 
where H is the Hessian (the determinant of the leftmost matrix in equation 8) and we 
require H>0 for a maximum. 
The effect of current income on the demand for owner-occupied housing is given by: 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 11
1
o
oo
x x x h
p ph V V
Y H H
∂ = − ⋅ + ⋅
∂
 
(10) 
The slope of the compensated demand curve (the Slutsky equation) is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 11 11 1
1
1 1
o o o
oo o
o
o x p h p
p pp ph hh V V
p Y H H H
λ
⋅∂ ∂+ ⋅ = − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
∂ ∂
 
(11) 
The slope of the compensated demand curve derived under these assumptions differs 
from the general case by the presence of the two extra terms. These terms involve the 
second derivatives of the expected utility function with respect to the price of owner-
occupied housing. As a result, they reflect the effect of current price changes on the 
expectations about future prices, which in turn changes the shape of the expected utility 
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function in the first period. Without further restrictions on the shape of the expected 
utility function, we cannot determine the sign of the slope of the compensated demand 
curve in equation (11), and even less the sign of the slope of the uncompensated demand 
curve in equation (9). Dusansky and Wilson (1993) do not discuss the specific conditions 
under which this market would be in equilibrium, but it is evident that this is a partial 
equilibrium based on the assumption that individuals are price takers. 
The main implication of the model is that without further restrictions on the utility 
function, the usual properties of the demand for housing are not warranted. It is possible 
for owner-occupied housing services to display a positive response of quantity consumed 
to an increase in their price. Dusansky and Wilson (1993) indentify such restrictions and 
show that most of the literature on housing demand uses overly restrictive assumptions 
when estimating the demand for housing services.30 
4. Empirical Model and Data 
4.1. Empirical Model 
In this section I present the empirical model used to test the theoretical implication 
that the uncompensated demand for owner-occupied housing services may be upward 
sloping. I follow an empirical strategy similar to that used in Dusanski and Koc (2007), 
but I use the semi-non-parametric Fourier series estimator to fit the hedonic functions, 
and I use data on multiple housing markets across the U.S. 
                                                          
30
 See Dusanski and Wilson (1993) for details on the specific restrictions. 
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The typical analysis in the housing literature involves two steps due to the 
heterogeneous nature of the housing good, for which a unit of measurement is not 
defined. In the data we observe the expenditure on owner-occupied housing, but not the 
price per unit of housing services or the quantity consumed. In the first step, a hedonic 
regression of house value on unit characteristics identifies the hedonic function, which is 
then used to construct the price of a standardized unit of housing in each market. This 
price proxies the price per unit of owner-occupied housing services. A similar procedure 
yields the price per unit of renter-occupied housing services (using rent as the dependent 
variable). Dividing the value of the housing unit by the price per unit of owner-occupied 
housing services yields the number of units of owner-occupied housing services 
consumed. In the second step, the uncompensated demand for owner-occupied housing 
services is estimated by regressing housing consumption (measured in units of 
standardized housing services) on the price of owner-occupied housing services, income 
and household characteristics. 
Two studies in the literature find opposite uncompensated effects of price on quantity 
of housing demanded using different functional forms for the hedonic functions and data 
on different housing markets in Florida. Rappaport (1997) reports a negative effect using 
a linear function, but Dusansky and Koc (2007) find a positive effect using the Box-Cox 
transformation on the dependent variable. It is natural to ask whether the different 
estimates are due to using different estimation methods for the hedonic functions. I first 
test the appropriateness of the Box-Cox model (transformation of the dependent variable 
only) for my data using Wald tests in each housing market. I obtain two sets of 
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parameters, one for observations above the median house value, and another for 
observations below the median house value in the same market. The hypothesis of equal 
parameter vectors is strongly rejected in each housing market.31 This suggests that the 
Box-Cox specification is overly restrictive for my data. I therefore use the more flexible 
semi-non-parametric Fourier series estimator, which is a global approximation of the 
conditional mean using linear series. The Fourier form involves a number of parameters 
that is proportional to the sample size, which gives its non-parametric power, but can be 
easily implemented using ordinary least squares. I use sine and cosine trigonometric 
terms which have the useful quality of being orthogonal to one another on the interval 
[0,2pi]. 
I now present the equations estimated in the two steps. In the first step, the hedonic 
price function is retrieved using the semi-non-parametric Fourier series estimator: 
[ ]1 2 2
1 1 1
sin( ) cos( )
M J A
im i m m i i im
m j
H X d a j k X b j k Xα α α α
α
β δ ξ
= = =
′ ′ ′= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ∑∑
 
(1) 
where Him denotes the value of unit i in market m. The vector X1 includes discrete 
categorical and binary variables describing the housing unit, and dm is an indicator 
variable for housing market m. The third term on the right-hand side is the Fourier series 
expansion based on the variables included in vector X2 (characteristics of the housing unit 
measured continuously). The ks denote elementary vectors constructed as described in 
Gallant (1981), such that the product k’X2 yields unique linear combinations of the 
                                                          
31
 In each housing market I split the dataset in two equal subsamples by the median housing value. I fit a 
Box-Cox model to each subsample to get the estimated parameters. I derive the covariance matrix of the 
parameters as the inverse of the information matrix. I then calculate Wald statistics for the difference 
between the two parameter vectors. The hypothesis of equal slopes is rejected in every market where 
enough information is available to obtain convergence in both subsamples. For more details see Wheelock 
and Wilson (2010). 
 66 
 
variables in X2. The error term ξim is assumed to have zero mean, homoskedastic variance 
and to be uncorrelated with the observed variables. The parameter vector β, the δs, as and 
bs are estimated using an ordinary least square regression and then used to construct the 
value of a standardized unit of housing: 
( )    ( ) ( )1 2 2
1 1
sin cos
J A
o M M M
mm
j
p X a j k X b j k Xα αα α
α
β δ
= =
′  ′ ′= + + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ∑∑ 
 
(2) 
The price of the standardized unit of owner-occupied housing described in equation (2) 
can be thought of as the price per unit of owner-occupied housing services in market m. I 
choose a standardized unit of housing that is described by the median (mode for discrete 
categorical and binary variables) of each characteristic in the entire sample (XM). 
Previous studies have used predictions at the mean of the characteristics, which is 
unrealistic since most characteristics of a house are discretely measured.32 Household i 
living in an owner-occupied house valued at Him therefore consumes o oim im mh H p=  units 
of housing services. A similar procedure yields the price per unit of rental housing rmp
after replacing Him with the contract rent and replacing X1 and X2 with vectors describing 
rental units. 
The quantity of housing services and the price per unit of owner-occupied housing are 
used in the second stage to estimate the demand for owner-occupied housing. As Rosen 
(1979) points out, we cannot simply estimate this equation by itself using ordinary least 
                                                          
32
 I have also built a house price index calculated as the weighted average of predicted values for observed 
types of housing units (there are 270) in the sample. The weights are the frequency of each unit type in the 
sample. However, since it did not affect the results in the second stage I choose not to pursue further. 
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squares as it would lead to inconsistent estimates. I now briefly revisit Rosen’s (1979) 
exposition. 
Assuming that owning and renting are mutually exclusive, and that a housing market 
has been chosen, if household i chooses to own, its utility is given by: 
( , , )ooi o iV v p p Y=
 
(3) 
where νo is the indirect utility function from owning a house, po is the price per unit of 
owner-occupied housing, p is the price index for all other consumption and Y is 
household income (I dropped the market subscript for readability). If the household 
chooses to rent, its utility is given by: 
( , , )r
ri r iV v p p Y=
 
(4) 
where νR is the indirect utility function from renting, pr is the price per unit of rental-
occupied housing and other variables are defined as above. The household chooses to 
own when: 
*( , , , ) 0o roi ri iV V I p p p Y− = >
 
(5) 
and to rent when the opposite is true. I*(•) is a utility index unobserved by the statistician. 
If inequality (5) holds, then the household chooses to own a house and we observe its 
consumption of owner-occupied housing: 
( , , )o oi ih h p p Y=
 
(6) 
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If inequality (5) does not hold, then the household chooses to rent and we do not observe 
o
ih .
33
 Assuming h(•) can be approximated by a linear function, household i’s demand for 
owner-occupied housing in market m can be written as: 
0 1 2 3 4
1
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im m i c ic im im im
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=
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(7) 
where xic are the set of observed characteristics and εim a set of unobserved household 
characteristics that influence the demand for owner-occupied housing. Assume E(εim|Xim) 
= 0 and Var(εim|Xim) = σε. 
The data we observe may be described as follows: 
im, if I 1
otherwise
im imo
im
X
h
α ε+ == −
 
(8) 
where 
im1, if I * 0
0 otherwiseim
I
>= 
 
(9) 
If we assume that I*(•) can be approximated by a linear function, we can write: 
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(10) 
where zic are a set of observed characteristics and ωim are a set of unobserved household 
characteristics that influence the choice between owning and renting. Assume E(ωim|Zim) 
= 0 and Var(ωim|Zim) = σω. The statistician does not observe I*im but only whether Iim = 1 
or not, with probability: 
                                                          
33
 I do not pursue the derivation of the demand for renter-occupied housing here as it is not the main 
objective of this paper 
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( ) ( ) ( )*Pr 1 Pr 0 Prim im im imI I Zω γ= = > = > −
 
(11) 
Equation (11) is the selection equation which determines whether we observe the quantity 
demanded of owner-occupied housing or not. 
If εi and ωi are correlated (correlation coefficient ρεω), ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation of equation (7) yields inconsistent estimates: 
( ) ( )
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(12) 
The OLS assumption that the conditional expectation of the error term is zero is violated. 
Under the assumption that εi and ωi are normally distributed, the true model is 
( )oim im im imh X Zεω εα ρ σ λ γ υ= + ⋅ ⋅ +
 
(13) 
where υim is a zero mean, homoskedastic variance error term. It has been assumed that σω 
= 1 (since it cannot be identified separately from γ) and λ(z) = φ(z)/Φ(z) is called the 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). Estimating equation (7) when the true model is (13) leads to 
inconsistent estimates of the parameter vector α. 
Since the γ parameters are unknown, Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step estimation 
of equation (13): in the first step, equation (11) is estimated using the Probit model to get 
consistent estimates of γ and construct the IMRs; in the second step, the following 
equation is estimated via OLS: 
( )oim im im imh X Zα η λ γ υ= + ⋅ +
 
(14) 
where εω εη ρ σ= ⋅ . 
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A more efficient approach to estimate equation (7) is jointly with equation (11) using 
the Maximum Likelihood approach. The likelihood of observing the pair ( oimh , Iim) is 
[ ] ( )1Pr( 0) | 1 Pr( 1) imim II oim im im im iml I f h I I−  = = ⋅ = ⋅ = 
 
(15) 
With probability Pr(Iim=0) the household has chosen to rent and we do not observe oimh . 
With probability Pr(Iim=1) the household has chosen to own and we observe the quantity 
of housing consumed h which takes value oimh  with probability f( oimh |Iim=1). Imposing the 
stronger assumption that εim and ωim follow the bivariate normal distribution with E(εim) = 
E(ωim) = 0, Var(εim) = σε, Var(ωim) = σω, and Corr(εim, ωim) = ρεω, yields the well-known 
sample selection model.34 The likelihood for observation i in market m (assuming the 
choice of market m has already been made) is written as: 
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(16) 
The product over all households gives us the likelihood of observing the entire sample 
and the parameters can be estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure. Since σω 
cannot be identified separately from γ, it is normalized to one. This model has the 
advantage of being more efficient over the Heckman two-step procedure, but it is more 
                                                          
34
 There is no agreement in the econometric literature about to who first developed this model. Cragg 
(1971) is among the first to introduce a generalized Tobit model where the regressors in the selection 
equation differ from those in the outcome equation. 
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restrictive in terms of the structure it imposes. The following section describes the data 
used to estimate equations (1), (7) and (11). 
4.2. Data 
I use the 2007 wave of the American Community Survey (ACS) to test the theoretical 
implications of the paper. My main reason for choosing this dataset is that the semi-non-
parametric estimation requires more information than parametric estimators. This data set 
has the advantage of a large number of observations covering the entire U.S. while the 
drawback is a small reduction in the information available on the characteristics of the 
housing unit, compared to specialized datasets like the American Housing Survey. 
The ACS is a yearly survey that covers a 1% random sample of the U.S. population 
such that each household is eligible for selection once every 5 years. It collects the 
information throughout the year and asks the same questions as the long form 
questionnaire of the Decennial Census. The smallest identifiable geographic unit is the 
Public Use Micro-data Area (PUMA), which is designed to include at least 100,000 
persons. I use the version of the data provided by ipums.org and the initial sample 
includes about 3 million observations.35 I keep records on the head of the household only 
and I assume that the characteristics of this individual are representative for the 
household in the ensuing analysis. I eliminate observations on individuals living in group 
quarters and observations on households that rent but do not pay cash rent. Units built on 
house lots of 10 acres or more are eliminated and so are units that are part of a 
                                                          
35
 Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly 
Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander.  Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008. 
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condominium. These units may have unobserved characteristics which are very different 
from the rest of the sample and including them has no obvious benefit. I also eliminate 
individuals who report non-positive household income and individuals who are older than 
65, since the theoretical model assumes that retirees do not own their houses. For my 
analysis I consider each PUMA a self-contained housing market in equilibrium. 
However, PUMAs that do not belong to a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or 
PUMAs that span two MSAs are more likely to cover heterogeneous housing markets. 
This would violate the assumption of a homogeneous price per market and I therefore 
eliminate these observations. I also eliminate the Louisiana PUMAs that have been 
affected by Hurricane Katrina and suffered major population displacements.36 My final 
sample includes 1,569 markets covering 47 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.37 
The final sample allows me to estimate the demand for owner-occupied housing services 
by individuals of working age and test the hypothesis of an asset appreciation effect of 
price on quantity of owner-occupied housing. These restrictions allow me to compare my 
results with Dusansky and Koc (2007), who found evidence of an upward sloping 
demand for housing services using 1990 data on five PUMAs in the state Florida. 
The final sample includes observations on 594,188 individuals, of which 404,763 are 
owners and 189,425 are renters. Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 
2.1. Heads of households that own a house are more likely to be males, about 8 years 
older than the head of a household that rents and 18% more likely to be white. Owners 
are more than twice as likely to be married as renters; they have larger families and are 
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 PUMAs coded 77777 in the state of Louisiana. 
37
 There are no observations left for Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming after the preceding filtering. 
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more likely to be U.S born. They are 12% more likely to have more than a high-school 
degree and half as likely to have a work disability. Two striking differences between 
owners and renters are related to their income: owners are almost 4 times more likely to 
have received income from dividend and their average household income is more than 
twice that of a renter.38 These differences suggest that there may be systematic 
differences between the preferences and constraints of households who choose to own 
and those who choose to rent. This suggests that a model that controls for selection bias 
should be used for the estimation of the demand for housing services. 
An important aspect of the estimation of the hedonic housing price functions is to 
choose the number of Fourier terms to be used. There is no consensus in the literature on 
this matter, some studies choose a number determined by the sample size and some 
follow an adaptive, data driven approach. Elbadawi et al. (1983) use a number of 
parameters in the model approximately equal to N(2/3) where N is the sample size. Gallant 
(1982) also recommends using a downward model selection method: start with a large 
number of terms; eliminate the term with the largest p-value; continue until some lower 
threshold for the p-value is attained. I use a combination of both methods to select the 
size of the parameter vector. Given the sample size (over 400,000 observations for the 
owner-occupied units), assessing the exclusion of one term at a time is extremely costly. I 
therefore experimented with 500 terms increments in the owner-occupied equation and 
tested the hypothesis that the group may be excluded from the specification (Table 2.9 in 
the Appendix shows the F-statistics for the exclusion tests). I reject the exclusion of each 
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 Household income is the sum of income for all household members. 
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additional group of 500 terms, which is strengthened by the improved fit suggested by the 
decrease in the root mean squared error (RMSE). Following ElBadawi et al. (1983), I use 
3,856 Fourier terms, which gives me a total number coefficients of 5,436. I perform a 
similar validation analysis for the renter-occupied hedonic equation, but using 50 terms 
increments (Table 2.10 in the Appendix shows the F-statistics). Again, more terms 
translate into an improved fit, but multi-collinearity problems allow me to use only 269 
Fourier terms and a total of 1,850 coefficients. 
The hedonic housing price function (equation 1) is estimated by regressing the self-
reported house value on house characteristics that include continuous variables (X2*), 
categorical and binary variables (X1), and market identifiers (dm). An overview of all 
variables used in this section is given in Table 2.3A. Seven variables are measured 
continuously: the number of rooms, bedrooms, building age, annual property insurance 
premium, annual property taxes, monthly owner costs (mortgage payments, real estate 
taxes, insurance, utilities, etc.) and the length of tenure in the current unit. The latter is 
included to control for any bias that may arise from the fact that the value of the house is 
self-reported rather than the recorded price of a transaction. These variables are 
transformed into five orthogonal principal components (X2) and used to construct 3,902 
Fourier trigonometric terms as described in the Appendix. The categorical variable 
indicates which of the 9 types of fuel is used to heat the house, the binary variables 
indicate whether the unit has complete plumbing, a separate kitchen and whether it is 
located on a farm. In total there are 5,436 right-hand side variables in the owner-occupied 
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hedonic equation.39 The estimated parameters are then used to construct the price per unit 
of owner-occupied housing as the value of a standardized owner-occupied housing unit in 
each housing market, omp  using equation (2).40 The price constructed this way is then 
used to calculate the consumption of owner-occupied housing ( oimh ). A similar equation is 
estimated for renter-occupied units with the dependent variable replaced by the monthly 
gross contract rent (contract rent plus utilities). The continuous variables only include the 
number of rooms, bedrooms, and the building’s age. An overview of the variables used in 
this section is given in Table 2.3B. The three continuous variables are standardized and 
transformed into two principal components, then used to expand 1,740 Fourier terms, as 
described in the Appendix. The X1 vector includes the same variables as in the housing 
price equation plus an indicator of whether meals are included in the gross rent. In total 
there are 1,850 right-hand side variables in the renter-occupied hedonic function.41 The 
estimated parameters are then used to construct the value of a standardized rental-
occupied housing unit in each housing market rmp  using equation (2). 
An issue that deserves attention was raised by Carliner (1973) who observed that the 
use of current income instead of permanent income biases downward the estimates of 
income elasticity of demand. I follow Rapapport (1997) and Dusansky and Koc (2007) 
                                                          
39
 The N(2/3) “rule” implies a total of (404,763)2/3 = 5,472 right-hand side variables. I use 5,482 variables but 
46 of the Fourier terms are dropped due to multi-collinearity. There are 3,856 Fourier terms, 1,568 market 
indicators, 8 indicator variables for the categorical variable, 3 binary variables and the constant. 
40
 See the Appendix for more details 
41
 The N(2/3) “rule” implies a total of (189,425)2/3 = 3,299 right-hand side variables. I use 3,321 variables but 
1,471 of the Fourier terms are dropped due to multi-collinearity. The multi-collinearity problem is more 
severe here because of the discrete nature of the variation in the variables included in the series expansion. 
There are 269 Fourier terms, 1,568 market indicators, 8 indicator variables for the categorical variable, 4 
binary variables and the constant.  
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and decompose observed income into permanent and transitory income. I extract the two 
components by regressing the Box-Cox transformation of household income on the 
characteristics of the head of the household: 
1
1 Mim
i m m im
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θ =
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(17) 
where Di are demographic characteristics determining the household income, dm are 
housing market indicators, λ and δs are parameters to be estimated and νim are household 
unobserved characteristics uncorrelated with the observed characteristics. Demographic 
characteristics include age, sex, race, education level, marital status, immigration status, 
occupation, and type of employment (self-employed, public or private sector)  of the 
household’s head; the number of additional workers in the household, an indicator of 
whether the household lives on a farm, and PUMA indicators. The Box-Cox fitted values 
are used to measure permanent income: 
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(18) 
The residuals im imY Y− measure transitory income. Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics 
for the two components.42 
Estimation of the demand equation (7) is undertaken using OLS, the Heckman two-
step estimator described by equation (14) and the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
described by equation (16). Following Rapaport (1997) I assume that the price of other 
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 Estimates are not shown here for brevity. There are 1,596 estimated parameters: 1568 PUMA indicators, 
10 occupation indicator variables, 7 indicator variables describing the class of worker, 10 indicator 
variables describing demographic characteristics and a constant. 
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goods, p is constant across PUMAs, and therefore its effect cannot be identified 
separately from the intercept. The MLE model of tenure choice and housing consumption 
implies that the price per unit of rental housing shows up in the selection equation (11) 
but not in the demand equation (7). This structural exclusion allows the coefficient on the 
IMR to be identified without relying on arbitrary functional form restrictions. Table 2.2 
shows the summary statistics for prices, quantities and income used to estimate the two 
equations.43 The demand shifters I use are similar to those used in Dusansky and Koc 
(2007): age, sex, race, education level, marital status, immigration status, whether the 
household earned dividend income, household size, an indicator of whether the 
household head has moved in the past 5 years, and whether the household head has a 
work disability. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Tables 2.1 and 
2.2.  
5. Results 
The first question addressed in this section is whether different estimates for the slope 
of the demand for owner-occupied housing services in the literature are due to using 
different estimation methods for the housing hedonic function. This question can be 
answered by using a less restrictive estimation method for the hedonic functions, the 
semi-non-parametric Fourier series estimator. The second question I address is whether 
                                                          
43
 For improved readability of the coefficients, all dollar measures will be rescaled to thousands of dollars 
for the estimation. The price per unit of rental-occupied housing (monthly gross rent) will be transformed 
into an annual measure through multiplication with 12 and the price per unit of owner-occupied housing 
(value of the house) will be transformed into an annual measure through division by 30 (the median length 
of a mortgage contract). 
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there is evidence in the data of an asset appreciation effect of price on quantity of owner-
occupied housing similar to that found by Dusansky and Koc (2007). 
The estimates of the parameters for the demand for owner-occupied housing are 
presented in Table 2.4. The demand equation was estimated using OLS (equation 7), the 
Heckman two-step procedure (equation 14) and maximum likelihood (MLE, equation 
16). All three models imply a downward sloping demand for owner-occupied housing 
services. The Heckman two-step and the MLE models both indicate the presence of 
sample selection: the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio (IMR) in the two-step 
procedure is statistically different from zero at 1% or better (t-statistic 34.7). The 
hypothesis that ρεω = 0 in the MLE model is rejected at 1% or better using the likelihood 
ratio test (chi-squared statistic 66,577.4). A Hausman test on the effect of owner-
occupied price implied by the two-step and the MLE shows that the two are statistically 
different (chi-squared statistic 4,415.3). Since the MLE is much more restrictive than the 
Heckman two-step procedure, I will use the Heckman two-step model as the benchmark 
for the rest of the analysis. 
Next, I analyzed the possibility of a non-linear effect of price on quantity. The second 
column in Table 2.5 suggests that the effect of price on quantity is decreasing in price. 
The effect is negative for units with a price less than $773,000 but positive for units with 
a price per unit of owner-occupied housing exceeding $773,000.44 Results so far suggest 
that the effect of price on quantity is negative, under the assumption that all households in 
the U.S. have homogenous preferences and unobserved constraints. 
                                                          
44
 Only 2 PUMAs in the state of New York have a price per unit of owner-occupied housing exceeding this 
level. 
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These results are different from Dusanski and Koc’s (2007) findings, but they may be 
due to using both a different estimation technique for the hedonic functions and different 
data. To isolate the effect, I first repeat the above analysis, but using the OLS model and 
the Box-Cox model (transformation of the dependent variable only) to estimate the 
hedonic functions in the first step. Table 2.6 shows the estimates for the demand equation 
(equation 7) under the three methods of estimation for the hedonic functions. The 
coefficient on price is negative and fairly similar across the three scenarios. The Hausman 
test for a single coefficient shows that they are, however, statistically different from one 
another: the chi-squared statistic for the difference between the OLS and the Box-Cox 
coefficients is 315.7, the test statistic for the difference between the OLS and the Fourier 
coefficients is 178.7, and the test statistic for the difference between the Box-Cox and the 
Fourier coefficients is 151.3. Evidence suggests that changing the estimation method of 
the hedonic functions does lead to different estimates for the slope of the demand, but it 
cannot explain the large differences found in the literature. The other possibility is that 
the data I am using is very different from the data used in Dusanski and Koc (2007). I 
therefore use a sample similar in geographical coverage and demographics to their study, 
but use the Fourier series estimator in the first step.45 The estimate (+0.059, S.E. 0.011) 
shows a statistically significant, positive effect of price on quantity. This suggests that 
these markets may indeed be different from the average housing market in the U.S. 
The next question that arises is whether this positive effect can be found in other 
housing markets. To answer this question, I estimate a model similar to the benchmark 
                                                          
45
 The definitions of the PUMAs have changed between 1990 and 2007. I used IPUMS’s maps and 
composition tables to identify the 2007 PUMAs that correspond to the ones used in Dusanski and Koc 
(2007). See Table 2.11 in the Appendix for the correspondence and differences in the coverage. 
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specification in Table 2.4 (the Heckman two-step model), but I allow the effect of the 
price to differ across states. Estimates of the price effects are presented in column 1 in 
Table 2.7. All estimates except one show a negative effect of price on quantity, 
suggesting a downward sloping demand for housing services. Next, I allow for the 
possibility that homeowners in a certain state have unobserved common characteristics 
that affect their demand for owner-occupied housing in the same way (tastes or 
constraints that are not measured in my data but are common to all households in a state). 
I therefore estimate a model where I control for state specific effects in addition to 
allowing the price effect to differ by state. The estimates in column 2 of Table 2.7 show 
that the magnitude of the coefficients changes considerably, more than half of them 
switching sign. The precision of the estimates falls significantly but that is expected since 
there are few markets in some states.46 There is no clear pattern for the effects presented 
in column 2 of Table 2.7: while in some states with “hot” housing markets the effect of 
price on quantity is positive (e.g. Florida), in others it is negative (e.g. California). This 
evidence is consistent with the existence of an asset appreciation effect in some of the 
U.S. states. A more cautious interpretation is that state-specific unobserved factors are 
important determinants of the demand for housing services, factors that my data does not 
allow me to measure well. 
The estimated coefficients of the control variables shown in Table 2.5 are in accord 
with previous findings in the literature. Permanent income and transitory income increase 
the demand for owner-occupied housing. Households receiving income from interest and 
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 The number of PUMAs in a state varies from 1 to 224 with a mean of 33. 
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dividends demand more owner-occupied housing.  If we interpret this variable to mean 
that these households are unconstrained in terms of liquidity, then the positive estimate 
suggests that housing investment is a normal good. If we believe that the permanent and 
transitory income effects refer to the demand for housing as a consumption good, the 
positive effects suggest that housing is a normal good in both of its qualities, as 
consumption good and as investment. The estimate of the correlation coefficient between 
the errors of the two equations, ρεω, is consistently positive across specifications. Its 
interpretation is that unobserved factors that make households want to own a house also 
makes them consume more housing services. The positive sign of this estimate is in 
accord with Rapaport’s (1997) findings but opposite to the negative sign found in 
Dusansky and Koc (2007). 
I present the estimates from the selection equation (equation 11) in Table 2.8. An 
increase in either the price per unit of owner-occupied of renter-occupied housing reduces 
the probability of owning a house, making it more likely that the household will rent. 
Allowing for a quadratic profile for both prices suggests that the price per unit of owner-
occupied housing has a positive effect on the probability of owning when the price is 
lower than 233 thousand dollars. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper I investigate whether different estimates for the slope of the demand for 
owner-occupied housing services are due to different methods of estimation used for the 
hedonic functions. The approach I take is to use the semi-non-parametric Fourier series 
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estimator to estimate the hedonic price functions and then to compare the results with 
those coming from using the parametric estimators used in the literature. Using data on a 
large sample from the 2007 American Community Survey, I find that changing the 
estimation method of the hedonic functions leads to different estimates for the slope of 
the demand, but the estimation method alone cannot explain the large differences found 
in the literature. Using different data on the other hand has a substantial impact on the 
estimates of the slope. However, evidence shows that the Box-Cox model so widely used 
in the literature may be overly restrictive for the estimation of housing hedonic functions. 
The second objective of this paper is to assess the existence of an asset appreciation 
effect of owner-occupied housing price on owner-occupied housing consumption, using 
data on housing markets covering multiple U.S. states. A theoretical model in the 
literature provides the theoretical foundations for its existence and a recent study has 
found evidence of a positive effect of price on the quantity demanded in a localized 
market. Using data on housing markets across the U.S., I find evidence of a negative 
effect of price on the quantity of owner-occupied housing services, under the assumption 
of homogenous preferences across housing markets. The effects are significantly 
different for household residing in different U.S. states. When I relax the homogeneity 
assumption and allow for state specific effects in addition to different price effects, I find 
evidence consistent with an asset appreciation effect in about half of the U.S. states. 
While this paper does not offer a definitive answer to the conundrum of which 
estimation technique is best for estimating housing hedonic functions, it adds to the 
growing evidence that semi-parametric and non-parametric techniques are a better choice 
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than the parametric techniques currently used in the literature (e.g. OLS, the Box-Cox 
transformation). The substantial differences among the effects of price on quantity in 
different U.S. states, obtained when controlling for unobserved state specific effects, 
suggests that better controls for state-level characteristics are desirable for the estimation 
of the demand for owner-occupied housing services. 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: demographic characteristics for heads of households  
Characteristic All Owners Renters 
Male 0.56 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.48 (0.50) 
Age 44.3 (11.6) 46.9 (10.4) 38.8 (12.3) 
White 0.76 (0.43) 0.81 (0.39) 0.63 (0.48) 
Married 0.58 (0.49) 0.70 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 
Household size 2.78 (1.49) 2.95 (1.46) 2.42 (1.50) 
Immigrant 0.08 (0.27) 0.05 (0.21) 0.14 (0.35) 
More than HS degree 0.67 (0.47) 0.71 (0.45) 0.59 (0.49) 
Disability 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.23) 0.10 (0.30) 
Moved in more than 5 yrs ago 0.53 (0.50) 0.66 (0.47) 0.24 (0.43) 
Receives Dividend Income 0.14 (0.35) 0.19 (0.39) 0.05 (0.22) 
Household Income (th) 84.8 (85.1) 102.2 (92.4) 47.6 (49.2) 
Sample size 594,188 404,763 189,425 
Notes: Standard Deviation in parentheses 
 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics: income, housing prices and consumption 
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Household Income ($/year) 594,188 84,792.3 85,084.7 1.0 2,004,087.0 
Permanent Income ($/year)† 594,188 71,825.1 40,691.6 3,903.1 378,853.8 
Transitory Income (/$year) † 594,188 12,967.2 71,649.8 -282,123.8 1,788,546.0 
House Value ($)ᵡ 404,763 318,773.1 245,209.4 5,000.0 1,000,000.0 
Price per unit of owner-occupied 
housing services ($) † 594,188 312,342.9 134,982.1 83,353.8 832,295.4 
  in (thousands $/year) ‡ 594,188 10.4 4.5 2.8 27.7 
Gross rent ($/month) 189,425 985.6 506.1 4.0 4,575.0 
Price per unit of rental-occupied 
housing services ($/month) † 594,188 888.0 295.8 399.0 2,237.2 
  in (thousands $/year) ‡ 594,188 10.7 3.5 4.8 26.8 
Consumption of owner housing 
services† 404,763 1.0 0.7 7.1E-3 12.0 
Consumption of rental housing 
services† 189,425 1.1 0.4 2.0E-3 5.8 
Notes: 
† denotes imputed measures 
‡ shows the variables in the scale used in the estimation: price for owner-occupied was 
divided by 30 years and price for renter-occupied was multiplied by 12 
ᵡ reported as the midpoint of the interval; top coded at$1 mil.  
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Table 2.3A: Characteristics of owner-occupied housing units 
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Rooms 404,763 6.6 1.6 1 9 
Bedrooms 404,763 3.3 0.8 0 5 
Building Age (years) 404,763 33.2 21.2 2 68 
Complete Plumbing† 404,763 1.00 0.05 0 1 
Separate Kitchen† 404,763 1.00 0.05 0 1 
Located on a farm† 404,763 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Heating Fuel: No fuel† 404,763 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Gas, pipes† 404,763 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Gas, tank† 404,763 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Electricity† 404,763 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Oil† 404,763 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Coal† 404,763 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Wood† 404,763 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Solar† 404,763 0.00 0.02 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Other† 404,763 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Property insurance cost‡ 404,763 969 917 0 9,999 
Property Taxesᵡ 404,763 3,077 2,526 0 10,000 
Owner cost 404,763 1,744 1,278 0 16,498 
Length of tenure (years) 404,763 10.6 8.7 1 30 
Notes: 
† denotes binary variable 
‡ top coded at 99.5th percentile within each state (higher values are the state means of all 
cases above these cutoffs) 
ᵡ calculated by taking the midpoint of the interval; top coded at $10,000 
 
Table 2.3B: Characteristics of renter-occupied housing units 
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Min Max 
Rooms 189,425 4.2 1.5 1 9 
Bedrooms 189,425 2.0 1.0 0 5 
Building Age (years) 189,425 37.1 20.6 2 68 
Complete Plumbing† 189,425 1.00 0.06 0 1 
Separate Kitchen† 189,425 0.99 0.08 0 1 
Located on a farm† 189,425 0.00 0.02 0 1 
Heating Fuel: No fuel† 189,425 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Gas, pipes† 189,425 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Gas, tank† 189,425 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Electricity† 189,425 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Oil† 189,425 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Coal† 189,425 0.00 0.02 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Wood† 189,425 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Solar† 189,425 0.00 0.02 0 1 
Heating Fuel: Other† 189,425 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Length of tenure (years) 189,425 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Notes: † denotes binary variable 
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Table 2.4: Estimated coefficients for the demand for owner-occupied housing 
Explanatory variable OLS Two-step MLE 
Price per unit of owner-
occupied housing services (th)‡ 
-0.010** 
(2.4E-4) 
-0.015** 
(2.8E-4) 
-0.024** 
(2.4E-4) 
Permanent Income (th) 0.006** (3.4E-5) 
0.006** 
(3.6E-5) 
0.007** 
(3.7E-5) 
Transitory Income (th) 0.003** (1.1E-5) 
0.003** 
(1.3E-5) 
0.003** 
(1.3E-5) 
Dividend Income† 0.144** (0.002) 
0.164** 
(0.003) 
0.200** 
(0.003) 
Age 0.004** (1.0E-4) 
0.006** 
(1.2E-4) 
0.009** 
(1.0E-4) 
Male† -0.032** (0.002) 
-0.033** 
(0.002) 
-0.029** 
(0.002) 
White† 0.007** (0.002) 
0.034** 
(0.003) 
0.091** 
(0.002) 
Married† -0.039** (0.003) 
0.015** 
(0.003) 
0.132** 
(0.003) 
Household size 0.037** (7.2E-4) 
0.045** 
(7.7E-4) 
0.060** 
(7.5E-4) 
Moved in more than 5 yrs ago† -0.138** (0.002) 
-0.071** 
(0.003) 
0.093** 
(0.002) 
More than HS degree† 0.101** (0.002) 
0.119** 
(0.002) 
0.153** 
(0.002) 
Immigrant† 0.069** (0.004) 
0.017** 
(0.005) 
-0.100** 
(0.004) 
Disability† -0.058** (0.004) 
-0.091** 
(0.004) 
-0.165** 
(0.004) 
Constant 0.326** (0.006) 
0.042** 
(0.010) 
-0.525** 
(0.006) 
ρεω - 0.375 0.949** (0.0E+0) 
ρεω ·σε - 0.217** (0.006) 
0.615** 
(9.4E-4) 
Sample size: 404,763 404,763 404,763 
Number of coefficients: 14 14 14 
Notes:  Dependent Variable: Units of consumption of owner-occupied housing services 
Coefficients are presented; standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for the 
Heckman two-step procedure account for the variance of the estimated inverse mills 
ratio and are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
† denotes a binary variable 
‡ transformed to an annual figure after dividing through 30 years 
** denotes significance at 1% or better; * is significant at 5% or better 
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Table 2.5: Estimated coefficients for the demand for owner-occupied housing: Quadratic 
price effect 
Explanatory variable 1 2 
Price per unit of owner-occupied 
housing services (th)‡ 
-0.015** 
(3.E-4) 
-0.026** 
(0.001) 
Price per unit of owner-occupied 
housing services, squared‡  
5.E-4** 
(4.E-5) 
Permanent Income (th) 
0.006** 
(4.E-5) 
0.006** 
(4.E-5) 
Transitory Income (th) 
0.003** 
(1.E-5) 
0.003** 
(1.E-5) 
Dividend Income† 
0.164** 
(0.003) 
0.159** 
(0.003) 
Age 
0.006** 
(1.E-4) 
0.005** 
(1.E-4) 
Male† 
-0.033** 
(0.002) 
-0.033** 
(0.002) 
White† 
0.034** 
(0.003) 
0.030** 
(0.003) 
Married† 
0.015** 
(0.003) 
0.004   
(0.003) 
Household size 
0.045** 
(8.E-4) 
0.044** 
(8.E-4) 
Moved in more than 5 yrs ago† 
-0.071** 
(0.003) 
-0.085** 
(0.003) 
More than HS degree† 
0.119** 
(0.002) 
0.116** 
(0.002) 
Immigrant† 
0.017** 
(0.005) 
0.027** 
(0.005) 
Disability† 
-0.091** 
(0.004) 
-0.084** 
(0.004) 
Constant 
0.042** 
(0.010) 
0.164** 
(0.012) 
Rho 0.375 0.300 
Sample size: 404,763 404,763 
Number of parameters: 14 15 
Notes:  Dependent Variable: Units of consumption of owner-occupied 
housing services 
Coefficients are presented; standard errors in parentheses 
† denotes a binary variable 
‡ transformed to an annual figure after dividing through 30 years 
** denotes significance at 1% or better; * is significant at 5% or 
better 
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Table 2.6: Estimated coefficients for the demand for owner-occupied housing: effect of 
changing the estimation method for the hedonic functions 
First-step Estimator OLS Box-Cox Fourier 
Price per unit of owner-
occupied housing services (th)‡ 
-0.016** 
(2.6E-4) 
-0.013** 
(3.1E-4) 
-0.015** 
(2.8E-4) 
Permanent Income (th) 0.006** (3.5E-5) 
0.007** 
(3.8E-5) 
0.006** 
(3.6E-5) 
Transitory Income (th) 0.003** (1.2E-5) 
0.003** 
(1.3E-5) 
0.003** 
(1.3E-5) 
Dividend Income† 0.165** (0.003) 
0.176** 
(0.003) 
0.164** 
(0.003) 
Age 0.006** (1.1E-4) 
0.006** 
(1.2E-4) 
0.006** 
(1.2E-4) 
Male† -0.035** (0.002) 
-0.035** 
(0.002) 
-0.033** 
(0.002) 
White† 0.040** (0.002) 
0.051** 
(0.003) 
0.034** 
(0.003) 
Married† 0.015** (0.003) 
0.013** 
(0.003) 
0.015** 
(0.003) 
Household size 0.046** (7.5E-4) 
0.045** 
(8.2E-4) 
0.045** 
(7.7E-4) 
Moved in more than 5 yrs ago† -0.054** (0.003) 
-0.092** 
(0.003) 
-0.071** 
(0.003) 
More than HS degree† 0.114** (0.002) 
0.125** 
(0.003) 
0.119** 
(0.002) 
Immigrant† 0.011* (0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.005) 
Disability† -0.091** (0.004) 
-0.088** 
(0.004) 
-0.091** 
(0.004) 
Constant 1.3E-4   (0.010) 
0.098** 
(0.011) 
0.042** 
(0.010) 
ρεω 0.432 0.284 0.375 
ρεω ·σε 0.246** (0.006) 
0.174** 
(0.007) 
0.217** 
(0.006) 
Sample size: 404,763 404,763 404,763 
Number of coefficients: 14 14 14 
Notes:  Dependent Variable: Units of consumption of owner-occupied housing services 
Coefficients are presented; standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors for the 
Heckman two-step procedure account for the variance of the estimated inverse mills 
ratio and are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
† denotes a binary variable 
‡ transformed to an annual figure after dividing through 30 years 
** denotes significance at 1% or better; * is significant at 5% or better 
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Table 2.7: Effect of price on quantity demanded of owner-occupied housing services, by state
State w/o State Fixed 
Effects 
w State Fixed 
Effects 
Alabama -0.055** (8.E-7) 0.039** (6.E-5) 
Alaska -0.022** (0.003) 0.010   (0.207) 
Arizona -0.029** (6.E-4) -0.005*  (0.002) 
Arkansas -0.059** (0.001) 0.055** (0.022) 
California -0.015** (3.E-4) -0.012** (7.E-4) 
Colorado -0.031** (7.E-4) -0.006*  (0.003) 
Connecticut -0.014** (9.E-4) -0.044** (0.002) 
Delaware -0.036** (0.001) 0.006   (0.017) 
District of Columbia -0.024** (0.001) -0.048** (0.008) 
Florida -0.014** (6.E-4) 0.047** (0.002) 
Georgia -0.036** (8.E-4) 0.038** (0.004) 
Hawaii -0.019** (9.E-4) -0.018*  (0.009) 
Idaho -0.035** (0.002) 0.012   (0.019) 
Illinois -0.009** (7.E-4) 0.012** (0.002) 
Indiana -0.059** (1.E-3) 0.068** (0.010) 
Iowa -0.059** (0.002) 0.111** (0.040) 
Kansas -0.049** (0.002) 0.101** (0.013) 
Kentucky -0.047** (0.001) 0.058** (0.014) 
Louisiana -0.053** (0.001) 0.059** (0.011) 
Maine -0.022** (0.003) -0.003   (0.038) 
Maryland -0.024** (6.E-4) -0.018** (0.002) 
Massachusetts -0.015** (6.E-4) -1.E-3   (0.003) 
Michigan -0.035** (9.E-4) 0.040** (0.005) 
Minnesota -0.025** (9.E-4) 0.052** (0.008) 
Mississippi -0.055** (0.002) -0.006   (0.026) 
Missouri -0.048** (1.E-3) 0.044** (0.006) 
Montana -0.045** (0.005) 0.062** (0.010) 
Nebraska -0.026** (0.003) -0.389** (0.041) 
Nevada -0.022** (8.E-4) -0.005   (0.006) 
New Hampshire -0.002   (0.004) 0.155   (0.202) 
New Jersey 0.008** (7.E-4) -0.039** (0.002) 
New Mexico -0.039** (0.001) 0.008   (0.008) 
New York -0.012** (5.E-4) -0.007** (7.E-4) 
North Carolina -0.045** (7.E-4) 0.041** (0.004) 
North Dakota -0.030** (0.007) 0.122** (0.014) 
Ohio -0.043** (9.E-4) 0.016*  (0.007) 
Oklahoma -0.061** (0.002) 0.006   (0.038) 
Oregon -0.024** (8.E-4) 0.019** (0.005) 
Pennsylvania -0.035** (8.E-4) 0.047** (0.003) 
Rhode Island -0.011** (0.002) -0.126** (0.037) 
South Carolina -0.044** (9.E-4) 0.051** (0.005) 
South Dakota -0.055** (0.006) 0.067** (0.011) 
Tennessee -0.047** (9.E-4) -0.011** (0.004) 
Texas -0.011** (0.001) -0.244** (0.003) 
Utah -0.034** (1.E-3) 0.022** (0.007) 
Virginia -0.025** (6.E-4) 0.004*  (0.002) 
Washington -0.021** (6.E-4) 0.007** (0.002) 
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State w/o State Fixed 
Effects 
w State Fixed 
Effects 
Wisconsin -0.026** (0.001) 0.052** (0.008) 
Rho -0.055** (8.E-7) 0.039** (6.E-5) 
Sample size: 404,763 404,763 
Number of parameters: 62 110 
Notes:  coefficients are presented; 
standard errors in parentheses are calculated using the covariance 
matrix of the coefficients  
** denotes significance at 1% or better; * is significant at 5% or 
better 
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Table 2.8: Probit regression for tenure choice 
 1 2 
Price per unit of owner-occupied 
housing services (th) -0.044** (7.E-4) 0.059** (0.002) 
Price per unit of owner-occupied 
housing services, squared  -0.004** (1.E-4) 
Price per unit of rental-occupied 
housing services (th) -0.063** (0.001) -0.076** (0.003) 
Price per unit of rental-occupied 
housing services, squared  9.E-4** (1.E-4) 
Permanent Income (th) 0.012** (1.E-4) 0.012** (1.E-4) 
Transitory Income (th) 0.006** (5.E-5) 0.006** (5.E-5) 
Dividend Income* 0.408** (0.008) 0.415** (0.008) 
Age 0.021** (2.E-4) 0.021** (2.E-4) 
Male† -0.003   (0.004) -0.001   (0.004) 
White† 0.246** (0.005) 0.241** (0.005) 
Married† 0.420** (0.006) 0.424** (0.006) 
Household size 0.094** (0.002) 0.093** (0.002) 
Moved in more than 5 yrs ago† 0.875** (0.005) 0.882** (0.005) 
More than HS degree† 0.119** (0.005) 0.123** (0.005) 
Immigrant† -0.365** (0.008) -0.368** (0.008) 
Disability† -0.295** (0.008) -0.296** (0.008) 
Constant -1.192** (0.013) -1.688** (0.022) 
Log-likelihood: -240,955.7 -239,904.7 
Sample size: 594,188 594,188 
Number of parameters: 15 17 
Notes:  Dependent Variable: Pr(Own=1) 
Coefficients are presented; standard errors in parentheses 
† denotes a binary variable 
‡ transformed to an annual figure after dividing through 30 years 
** denotes significance at 1% or better; * is significant at 5% or better 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER ONE 
1. The option value of a location 
The “option value” of the location in equation (8) is given by: 
20 1 1 2 12max{( ) ( ),0}E z L w L M+ − + −
 
(1) 
where z1 is a random variable with mean 1w  and variance 21σ  as seen from the moment 
before moving to location 1. The variable 21 1 2 12( )z z L w L M= + − + − is distributed 
normally with mean 1 21 2 12( )z w L w L Mµ = + − + − and variance 2 21zσ σ= . The maximum 
operator will take the value zero whenever the realization of z is less than zero and the 
realization when the reverse is true. We may therefore write: 
0 0max{ ,0} Prob( 0) ( | 0) Prob( 0) 0E z z E z z z= ≥ ⋅ ≥ + ≤ ⋅
 
(2) 
After we replace in for z, 
1 2 11 2 12 1
0 0
1 1
( ) ( )
max{ ,0} Prob ( | 0)z w w L M w LE z E z z
σ σ
 − + − − += ≥ ⋅ ≥  
 
(3) 
Taking advantage of the normality assumption placed on z1: 
2 12 12 1
0 0
1
( ) ( )
max{ ,0} 1 ( | 0)w L M w LE z E z z
σ
  + − − + = −Φ ⋅ ≥     
 
(4) 
where Ф is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. The second term 
can be written explicitly as: 
2 20 0 1 1 2 12 1 1 2 12( | 0) ( ) | ( ) 0E z z E z L w L M z L w L M ≥ = + − + − + − + − ≥ 
 
(5) 
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2 20 1 2 12 0 1 1 1 2 12( | 0) ( ) | ( ) 0E z z L w L M E z z L w L M ≥ = − + − + + − + − ≥ 
 
(6) 
The last term in equation (6) can be written explicitly as: 
2 2 12 1
1 1 1
( )
20 1 1 1 2 12
1 2 11 2 12 1
1 1
( )
( | ( ) 0)
( ) ( )Prob
w L M L
z f z dz
E z z L w L M
z w w L M w L
σ σ
∞
+ − −
⋅ ⋅
+ − + − ≥ =  − + − − +≥  
∫
 
(7) 
where z1 is defined as above. The integral in the numerator simplifies to: 
2 2 12 1
2 12 12 1
1 1 1 1
1( )
2 12 12 1
1
1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )1
w L M L
w L M w L
z f z dz
w L M w L
w
σ φ σ
σ
∞
+ − −
 + − − +⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ +  
  + − − + + ⋅ −Φ     
∫
 
(8) 
where φ is the probability density function of the normal distribution. Substituting 
Equation 8 into equation 7 and then back into Equation 6, we get: 
[ ]0 1 1
( )( | 0)
1 ( )
sE z z s
s
φσ σ≥ = − ⋅ + ⋅
−Φ
 
(9) 
where  
2 12 12 1
1
( ) ( )w L M w L
s
σ
+ − − +
=
 
 
Substituting the above into Equation 4 yields: 
[ ]0 1 1( | 0) ( ) 1 ( )E z z s s sσ φ σ≥ = ⋅ − ⋅ −Φ
 
(10) 
which we may simplify to: 
2 12 12 1
0 1
1
( ) ( )( | 0) w L M w LE z z σ
σ
 + − − +≥ = ⋅Ψ   
 
(11) 
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where ( ) ( ) ( )1s s s sφΨ = − ⋅ − Φ    is a non-negative, monotonically decreasing convex 
function, with ( ) ( ) 1s s′Ψ =Φ − . 
It is not straight-forward to discern the effect of the variance on the value of the 
expression in Equation 11. We take the derivative with respect to σ1: 
2 10 2 12 1
1 1
( | 0) ( ) 0E z z w L M w Lφσ σ
 ∂ ≥ + − − += ≥ ∂  
 (12) 
This expression suggests that a higher earnings variance increases the “option value” 
of the location. The second order derivative with respect to σ1 implies that the 
improvement in the “option value” of the location is higher, the higher the variance: 
( )
2
2 2 12 12 1 2 10 2 12 1
3
1 1 11
( )( | 0) ( ) 0w L M w LE z z w L M w Lφσ σ σσ
 + − − +  ∂ ≥ + − − + = ⋅ ≥ ∂ ∂  
 
(13) 
2. Data 
In this section I explain how I filtered the data to obtain the final sample and how I 
have constructed the variables used in the estimation. 
I use data from the 5% sample of the 2000 US Census provided by IPUMS47. The 
Census provides information on a large number of individuals on numerous topics like 
location, education, income and other. For each individual the Census reports the current 
location (subject to disclosure restrictions) and the location where they lived 5 years ago 
(i.e. 1995). I restrict my sample to individuals of age 23 to 27 in 2000, who have earned 
                                                          
47
 Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly 
Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander.  Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008. 
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at least a Bachelor’s degree, which gives me 195,059 observations to start with. I further 
exclude the following groups: 
- individuals who were born in another country than U.S. 
- individuals who have moved outside of U.S. or have moved in from another 
country in the past five years 
- individuals who live in group quarters 
- individuals who have a work disability 
- individuals who report being enrolled in school 
- individuals who work for the Army 
After imposing these restrictions I am left with 115,183 observations. Due to missing 
data on location characteristics I exclude all individuals residing in the states of Rhode 
Island, Maine and Hawaii and end up with a final dataset of 113,834 observations. 
This dataset provides us with key elements of the migration decision: the 2000 and 
1995 residence, the birth location, earnings and demographic characteristics. The 
residence is identified by the city, public use micro-data area (PUMA), metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) and US state, subject to disclosure restrictions. Not all the 
information is available for all individuals and sometimes only the information on the US 
state and PUMA of residence is present. I make the following imputations for missing 
data on location: if the individual lives in the same house, and the previous city or MSA 
is undisclosed, I replace the missing information with the current city or MSA. The 1995 
and 2000 residences are assumed to be the origin and the chosen destination. The 
possibility exists that the individual had moved to an intermediary location during this 
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period and thus the origin is not measured accurately. Such a miss-measurement may 
impact the precision of my measure of distance form origin to destination but there is no 
readily available correction in the data. I choose the MSA as the geographical unit that 
characterizes the individual’s location options for three reasons: it is the most frequently 
used unit describing standalone labor markets in the literature; it maximizes the amount 
of data that can be used; and because 82% of the individuals in my sample reside in a 
MSA in 2000.  I include seventy-two of the largest MSAs (see Table 1.7 in the 
Appendix) such that all MSAs with population in excess of 1 million inhabitants are 
included. In addition, if a particular state is not represented among the MSA-type 
locations, I include the largest MSA in that state even if it has a population smaller than 1 
million48. To minimize the loss of information I also include 47 capture-all locations 
consisting of the geographical area and population of the state left after extracting the 
area and population of the MSAs used as standalone locations49. This gives me 119 
locations covering 47 of the American states. 
Mobility rates in the sample are quite high: almost 83% of individuals (94,137) in my 
sample currently reside in a different house than in 1995. However, depending on the 
definition, not all of the relocations will qualify as migration. Figure 1.7 in the Data 
section of the Appendix presents the effect of migration definition on mobility rates. 
Defining migration as moves between two PUMAs reduces the mobility rate to 55%. The 
U.S. Census Bureau defines PUMAs as geographical units with a population between 
100,000 and 200,000 inhabitants and do not cross state borders. The U.S. Office of 
                                                          
48
 Except for Alaska and Rhode Island where I do not have data on the cost of living for any of the MSAs. 
49
 I exclude Hawaii, Maine and Rhone Island due to missing information on the cost of living. 
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Management and Budget defines the Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) as “a core area 
containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a 
high degree of economic and social integration with that core”. The MSA (which is a 
CBSA) is therefore much more likely to define a standalone labor market than a PUMA. 
Defining migration as the move between two MSAs reduces the mobility rate to 44%, as 
disclosure restrictions prevent me from identifying the origin or the destination MSA for 
12,144 individuals. For my analysis, I define migration as the move between two 
locations (as defined in the paragraph above). Moves within the same location are 
considered residential moves (do not involve a change in labor markets but only in 
residential markets) and are therefore categorized as non-migration. Following this 
definition, 44,914 (39%) moves between standalone MSA locations and 1,837 (2%) 
moves between capture-all locations are encoded as migration moves. The cost of my 
definition, which aggregates some MSAs into capture-all locations, is that 4,997 (5% of 
the sample) moves are categorized as non-migration. The benefit is that I keep these 
observations which otherwise would have been excluded due to lack of information on 
those MSAs. The final migration rate in the sample is 41%. 
The mean and the variance of the earnings an individual expects to get in every 
location are the central determinants of location choice in my analysis. In each location I 
construct age specific earnings distributions for college graduates and I calculate the 
mean and the standard deviation of the earnings distribution weighted by the Census 
person-weights. Table 1.9 in the Appendix presents the observed earnings distributions 
for all MSA locations in my sample ranked by the standard deviation of their earnings 
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distribution. Plots of earnings for each location show that the earnings distributions are 
right-skewed, more so for locations with high earnings variance than for those with low 
variance. Table 1.9 reveals that locations with higher earnings variance also have high 
means for their distributions; the correlation coefficients between the two is +0.64. The 
correlation coefficient between standard deviation and maximum earnings is +0.78. The 
highest earnings opportunities in the sample are measured in Fort Lauderdale, FL, also 
the location with the highest earnings variance. The lowest earnings opportunities are 
measured in Fresno, CA, the fifth lowest location in terms of earnings variance. These 
observations suggest that the standard deviation of earnings is a good proxy for earning 
opportunities in the sense implied by the theoretical model. 
Variable moving costs have two components: the distance between the previous 
location and destination and the distance between the state where the individual was born 
and destination. The Census 2000 Gazetteer provides information on latitude and 
longitude for all counties in the U.S. The Fair Market Rent (FMR) dataset maintained by 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development provides information on MSAs 
composition of county subdivisions and the FIPS codes of both types of entities. This 
allows me to link the geographical information from the Gazetteer with the MSAs. The 
latitude of an MSA is calculated as the average of the latitudes of all component counties 
subdivisions, using the 2000 county population as weights. Similar calculations apply to 
longitude. This gives me the geographical position of the population centroid of the 
MSA. The same procedure is used to identify the population centroid of a capture-all 
location. All counties that have not been included in standalone MSA locations make up 
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the capture-all location. Distances are measured using the Haversine formula for the 
Great Circle distance between the origin o and the destination d50 
( ) ( )2 22 arcsin sin cos cos sin
2 2
d o d o
od d oD r
φ φ λ λφ φ− −   = ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅      
 
(1) 
where: 
r = 3,958.76 miles, the radius of the Earth at the equator 
φ = the latitude of the location, measured in radians (degrees*pi/180) 
λ= the longitude of the location, measured in radians (degrees*pi/180) 
The same formula is used for calculating the distance from the birthplace to the 
location where the individual resides in 2000. Figure 1.8 shows the distribution of 
distances (in hundreds of miles) travelled from origin to destination by individuals who 
migrated according to the definition of migration used in this paper. The distribution has 
a mean of 563 miles and a standard deviation of 682 miles. Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show the 
distribution of distances between the birthplace and the location where the individual 
resides in 2000. The mean and standard deviations are 585 miles and 717 miles for 
migrants and 223 miles and 458 miles for non-migrants. 
Other location attributes include population size, climatic attributes, pollution, crime 
levels, cost of living and characteristics of the housing market. Table 1.8 in the Data 
section of the Appendix presents summary statistics for these location characteristics. The 
FMR dataset provides information on the population of U.S. counties which I use to 
calculate the population of the locations that I define. Counties are sub-divided such that I 
                                                          
50
 Sinnott, R. (1984): “Virtues of the Haversine," Sky and Telescope, 68(2), 158. 
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can identify exactly which part of the county belongs to the MSA and which does not. 
County sub-divisions that do not belong to an MSA are used to calculate the population 
of the capture-all locations. Table 1.7 in the Appendix shows the 2000 population in 
thousands and the un-weighted sample size for each standalone MSA. 
The climatic characteristics I include in my estimation are the cooling and heating 
degree-days provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in its 
Comparative Climatic Data report. The 2000 report for U.S cities provides average values 
for the 1971-2000 period. A heating degree-day is a temperature degree that is necessary 
to keep the inside temperature at 65F throughout the day. For an example, if Tuesday the 
outside temperature is 60F, 5 degrees are needed to raise the temperature to 65 that day. 
The degrees for each day are then cumulated for the entire year yielding the heating 
degree-days. The cooling degree-day is defined similarly except that it is a temperature 
degree needed to reduce the temperature to 65F. I calculate the average degrees per day 
by dividing through the number of days in a year (365) and then rescale it to 5-degrees 
units. The transformed measure represents the number of 5 degrees units per day 
necessary to keep the temperature at 65F. For locations where information is unavailable, 
missing data is imputed using the climatic characteristics of the closest location for which 
data are available. For capture-all locations in states in which information was available 
on only one major city, that information was imputed for the capture-all location. For 
example, climatic information in the state of Delaware is only available for Wilmington. 
Since Wilmington is a standalone MSA location, no other information is available for the 
capture-all location consisting of the rest of the state of Delaware. I therefore used 
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information on Wilmington to describe the climatic characteristics in the Delaware 
capture-all location. Where multiple cities were available in a capture-all location, the 
population weighted average was used to measure the climatic characteristics of the 
location. 
I use the Environmental Protection Agency’s PM10 measure as a proxy for location 
pollution. PM10 is the concentration of particulate matter with a diameter smaller than 10 
micrometers in the air (µg/m3). The information is available for multiple monitoring 
stations within U.S. counties. I calculate the average of the monitors for each county and 
then I calculate the population weighted average for each location using the same FMR 
correspondence as above. For readability of the coefficients, I rescale the measure to 1/10 
of a µg/m3. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation provides detailed information on crime at MSA 
and city level in their “Crime in the United States” report for 2000. I use the measures for 
two major categories of crimes: violent crime and property crime. When the area 
reporting is less than 100% of the total area, I use the estimated total figure. For the few 
MSAs that are not covered (some states did not participate in the Uniform Crime 
Reporting program) I collect the information from the state agency’s website. For 
capture-all locations I calculate the population weighted average number of crimes for 
each of the two categories. I then transform the measures in per-capita terms using the 
location population. Finally, I follow Bishop (2007) to calculate a per-capita crime index 
that places 10 times more weight on violent crimes compared to property crimes: 
(number of per-capita violent crimes) + (number of per-capita property crimes/10). 
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An important characteristic of any location is the housing market. Housing prices 
convey concentrated information on location amenities that may otherwise be 
unmeasured and they may also proxy for the cost of living, return on housing asset 
investments, etc. I use the National Association of Realtors’ (NAR) housing price index 
to describe the housing market in each location.51 The NAR uses information on existing-
home sales to calculate the median sales price. The information is only available for large 
MSAs, which requires imputations for capture-all locations. Information missing for 
standalone MSA locations was imputed using the closest MSA (preferably in the same 
state) with the closest population size. Information for capture-all locations was imputed 
using the lowest price in the state when only information on standalone MSAs was 
available in that state. When information on MSAs that were not included as standalone 
locations was available, the population weighted average was assigned to the capture-all 
location. 
I use the ACCRA index for 1999 published by the Council for Community and 
Economic Research to measure the cost of living in a location.52 The index’s base is the 
national average such that a value of 105 says that this location is 5% more expensive 
than the national average. The index is calculated quarterly for medium-to-large cities 
and covers groceries, housing, utilities, transportation, health care and other goods and 
services. If the information for a standalone MSA was missing, I used information on the 
same urban area from the previous quarter or year. If none was available, I used an MSA 
of the same population size in the same state to impute the information. For non-MSA 
                                                          
51
  I thank Mr. Thomas J. Doyle for making the NAR data available to me. 
52
  I thank Mr. Dean Frutiger for making the ACCRA data available to me. 
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type locations I used the population weighted average of the cost of living for MSAs and 
cities that were not included in the MSA type locations. 
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Table 1.7: Population and sample size in 2000 for selected MSAs 
Location Name Pop. 
(1,000s) 
Sample 
size 
Akron, OH 695 270 
Albuquerque, NM 713 183 
Atlanta, GA 4,112 2,516 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 1,250 921 
Baltimore, MD 2,465 1,187 
Birmingham, AL 921 441 
Boise City, ID 432 141 
Boston, MA-NH 3,407 3,296 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, 
NY 1,170 451 
Charlotte-Gastonia-
Rock Hill, NC-SC 1,499 911 
Chicago, IL 8,092 4,524 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 1,554 808 
Cleveland-Lorain-
Elyria, OH 2,251 1,019 
Columbia, SC 537 347 
Columbus, OH 1,540 958 
Dallas, TX 3,446 2,465 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 951 345 
Denver, CO 2,092 1,518 
Des Moines, IA 456 185 
Detroit, MI 4,442 1,408 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 1,623 424 
Fresno, CA 923 173 
Grand Rapids-
Muskegon-Holland, MI 1,089 394 
Greensboro--Winston-
Salem-High Point, NC 1,252 583 
Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC 962 338 
Hartford, CT 1,183 363 
Houston, TX 4,178 1,482 
Indianapolis, IN 1,607 837 
Jackson, MS 441 231 
Jacksonville, FL 1,100 363 
Kansas City, MO-KS 1,776 911 
Knoxville, TN 687 274 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 1,563 307 
Little Rock-North Little 
Rock, AR 584 236 
Los Angeles-Long 
Beach, CA 9,519 4,074 
Louisville, KY-IN 1,026 444 
Madison, WI 427 262 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 1,136 436 
Miami, FL 2,253 377 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, 
WI 1,501 597 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
MN-WI 2,969 1,522 
Nashville, TN 1,231 757 
New Orleans, LA 1,317 425 
New York, NY 8,391 9,060 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC 1,570 504 
Oklahoma City, OK 1,083 288 
Omaha, NE-IA 717 239 
Orlando, FL 1,645 707 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 5,101 2,401 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 3,252 1,238 
Pittsburgh, PA 2,359 1,183 
Portland-Vancouver, 
OR-WA 1,918 954 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel 
Hill, NC 1,188 1,109 
Richmond-Petersburg, 
VA 997 575 
Riverside-San 
Bernardino, CA 3,255 407 
Rochester, NY 1,098 535 
Sacramento, CA 1,628 504 
St. Louis, MO-IL 2,605 1,086 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, 
UT 1,334 504 
San Antonio, TX 1,592 431 
San Diego, CA 2,814 1,107 
San Francisco, CA 1,731 2,539 
San Jose, CA 1,683 797 
Seattle-Bellevue-
Everett, WA 2,415 1,420 
Syracuse, NY 732 353 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL 2,396 743 
Toledo, OH 618 258 
Tucson, AZ 844 283 
Tulsa, OK 803 246 
Washington, DC-MD-
VA-WV 4,710 3,663 
West Palm Beach-Boca 
Raton, FL 1,131 304 
Wilmington-Newark, 
DE-MD 586 302 
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Table 1.8: Summary statistics for location amenities by location type 
Location name Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
MSA-type      
Population (10,000s) 72 20.0 18.4 4.3 95.2 
Crime index 72 9.2 3.6 1.2 19.3 
Violent Crimes per capita 72 5.4 2.6 0.6 12.9 
Property Crimes per capita 72 38.0 14.4 5.9 70.0 
Cooling degree-days 72 0.9 0.6 0.1 2.4 
Heating degree-days 72 2.2 1.1 0.1 4.3 
Pollution (10-7g/m3 ) 72 2.5 0.6 0.9 5.0 
Median home price ($10,000s) 72 14.2 6.9 8.1 50.6 
Cost of Living 72 1.1 0.2 0.9 2.3 
Non-MSA type      
Population (10,000s) 47 29.1 26.6 2.8 140.0 
Crime index 47 0.5 0.5 0.0 2.7 
Violent Crimes per capita 47 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.4 
Property Crimes per capita 47 2.4 2.4 0.2 13.6 
Cooling degree-days 47 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.2 
Heating degree-days 47 3.2 0.6 1.4 4.4 
Pollution (10-7g/m3 ) 47 2.3 0.5 1.3 3.8 
Median home price ($10,000s) 47 11.9 4.7 2.8 34.0 
Cost of Living 47 1.1 0.2 0.9 2.3 
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Table 1.9: Earnings distributions for the MSA-type locations ranked by standard deviation 
Location name Std Dev 
($1,000s) 
Mean 
($1,000s) 
5th 
($1,000s) 
50th 
($1,000s) 
Max 
($1,000s) 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 37.5 31.2 0.0 28.0 585.0 
San Jose, CA 35.6 44.6 4.0 40.0 325.0 
New York, NY 34.5 36.1 1.0 32.0 357.0 
San Francisco, CA 32.5 38.2 4.0 33.1 355.0 
Oklahoma City, OK 32.7 25.9 0.0 22.0 318.0 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 28.7 31.7 1.0 29.0 576.0 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 28.0 27.0 1.4 24.0 321.0 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 26.2 30.0 2.7 27.0 336.0 
Miami, FL 26.8 27.7 0.0 27.0 320.0 
Sacramento, CA 26.8 29.8 2.9 27.0 315.0 
Nashville, TN 26.1 29.3 4.5 26.5 353.0 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 25.9 28.9 2.2 27.0 320.0 
Tucson, AZ 25.9 25.9 0.0 23.0 305.0 
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 24.9 33.4 5.0 31.0 311.0 
Boston, MA-NH 24.3 33.3 4.0 30.2 410.0 
Birmingham, AL 23.9 27.5 0.9 25.6 322.0 
Akron, OH 23.9 25.6 1.2 25.0 310.0 
Chicago, IL 23.7 32.9 3.3 30.0 317.0 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 23.2 24.4 0.2 23.0 310.0 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 22.5 30.4 3.0 28.8 310.0 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 22.6 29.1 0.7 27.0 305.0 
Houston, TX 22.2 31.5 0.0 30.0 324.0 
Denver, CO 22.0 29.7 3.5 27.5 316.0 
Detroit, MI 21.5 31.3 3.0 30.0 326.0 
Dallas, TX 21.5 32.0 2.5 30.0 324.0 
Kansas City, MO-KS 21.5 29.8 4.0 28.0 316.0 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 21.4 32.6 4.0 30.0 328.0 
Atlanta, GA 21.1 31.2 3.2 30.0 315.0 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 21.1 30.7 5.0 28.0 312.0 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 21.0 30.6 3.0 30.0 321.0 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 20.4 30.1 2.0 27.0 264.0 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 20.4 27.4 2.7 25.0 299.0 
San Diego, CA 20.5 28.0 2.5 26.0 311.0 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High 
Point, NC 19.9 26.9 6.0 26.0 312.0 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 19.8 28.0 5.0 26.5 321.0 
Rochester, NY 19.7 26.4 3.0 25.0 347.0 
Average for Top 36 25.1 31.4 2.4 29.0 355.7 
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Table 1.9 (Continued): Earnings distributions for the MSA-type locations ranked by standard 
deviation 
Location name Std Dev 
($1,000s) 
Mean 
($1,000s) 
5th 
($1,000s) 
50th 
($1,000s) 
Max 
($1,000s) 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 19.5 28.0 2.9 27.0 146.0 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 18.9 28.6 4.0 28.0 310.0 
Baltimore, MD 18.8 29.0 2.5 28.0 314.0 
Hartford, CT 18.7 31.3 3.2 30.9 142.0 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 18.4 26.9 1.4 27.0 326.0 
New Orleans, LA 18.3 25.6 0.0 24.0 113.0 
Columbus, OH 18.0 28.6 4.0 28.0 310.0 
St. Louis, MO-IL 17.9 27.7 2.6 26.0 316.0 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 17.8 25.1 1.0 23.2 122.0 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 17.7 29.3 5.2 28.0 270.0 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 17.5 29.6 0.3 28.6 115.0 
Pittsburgh, PA 17.4 25.8 1.7 24.0 310.0 
Knoxville, TN 17.3 25.1 0.8 24.0 140.0 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 17.3 27.6 4.2 27.0 264.0 
San Antonio, TX 17.5 25.7 0.5 25.2 195.0 
Albuquerque, NM 17.3 25.6 2.7 24.0 95.0 
Toledo, OH 16.6 26.1 2.0 25.0 150.0 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 16.2 26.2 3.4 26.0 115.0 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 16.4 24.9 0.0 25.1 125.0 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 16.3 27.8 1.6 26.0 100.0 
Orlando, FL 16.2 26.4 5.0 25.0 161.0 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 16.1 29.1 5.0 27.7 120.0 
Tulsa, OK 15.8 26.9 2.1 25.5 120.0 
Jacksonville, FL 16.0 26.7 1.2 27.0 97.0 
Indianapolis, IN 15.7 30.5 5.5 30.0 109.0 
Syracuse, NY 15.4 24.9 1.3 24.4 105.0 
Boise City, ID 15.3 23.7 0.0 22.8 90.0 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 14.8 27.8 3.2 28.0 80.0 
Madison, WI 14.7 24.7 3.6 24.3 135.0 
Jackson, MS 14.6 24.7 1.0 24.2 100.0 
Louisville, KY-IN 14.4 27.1 7.0 26.0 112.8 
Fresno, CA 14.4 24.3 0.0 25.2 71.0 
Columbia, SC 14.3 25.4 2.9 24.7 84.0 
Des Moines, IA 14.1 28.1 3.5 28.5 116.0 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, 
VA-NC 13.8 23.4 0.8 23.0 110.0 
Omaha, NE-IA 13.9 26.2 1.6 26.0 92.0 
Average for Bottom 36 16.9 27.1 2.5 26.3 185.1 
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Table 1.10: Estimated coefficients for Nested Logit (NL) and Conditional Logit(CL) 
Independent variable NL 4 CL 4 CL 5 
Mean Earnings ($10,000) - M  3.233** (0.746) 3.871** (0.860) -4.867   (3.174) 
Earnings Standard Deviation ($10,000) - S -2.647** (0.554) -3.376** (0.645) -1.820   (2.310) 
M x S  2.772** (0.638) 3.491** (0.753) -5.735   (3.321) 
M2  -2.564** (0.562) -3.070** (0.652) 6.448* (3.242) 
 S2 -0.008   (0.339) 0.019   (0.403) 4.613** (1.456) 
M x S2 -0.412   (0.255) -0.356   (0.302) -14.559** (2.172) 
M2 x S -0.526   (0.343) -0.811* (0.407) 14.468** (2.755) 
M3  0.709** (0.189) 0.898** (0.222) -5.989** (1.667) 
 S3 0.123** (0.047) 0.090   (0.056) 4.227** (0.854) 
M2 x S2 0.053   (0.058) 0.031   (0.068) 5.994** (1.480) 
M x S3 0.004   (0.025) 0.018   (0.030) -1.637* (0.770) 
M3 x S 0.031   (0.060) 0.072   (0.072) -5.913** (1.238) 
M4  -0.067** (0.024) -0.091** (0.029) 2.051** (0.463) 
 S4 -0.009   (0.007) -0.010   (0.008) -0.184   (0.104) 
M2 x S3 - - -0.090   (0.163) 
M3 x S2 - - -0.436   (0.271) 
M x S4 - - 0.164** (0.043) 
M4 x S - - 0.568** (0.195) 
M5 - - -0.204** (0.055) 
 S5 - - -0.023** (0.009) 
Fixed cost of moving -2.017** (0.014) -2.273** (0.011) -2.274** (0.011) 
Distance Origin to Destination (th. mi) -3.285** (0.320) -4.058** (0.379) -4.077** (0.379) 
Distance Origin to Destination, Sq. 0.947** (0.146) 1.164** (0.174) 1.188** (0.174) 
Distance Birthplace to Destination (th. mi) 1.066** (0.341) 1.442** (0.410) 1.414** (0.410) 
Distance Birthplace to Destination, Sq.  -0.525** (0.146) -0.692** (0.175) -0.676** (0.175) 
D-o-D x Age 0.030* (0.013) 0.036* (0.015) 0.036* (0.015) 
D-o-D-sq x Age -0.007   (0.006) -0.008   (0.007) -0.009   (0.007) 
D-o-B x Age -0.065** (0.013) -0.083** (0.016) -0.082** (0.016) 
D-o-B-sq x Age 0.027** (0.006) 0.034** (0.007) 0.033** (0.007) 
Destination is in the birth state 1.219** (0.014) 1.453** (0.013) 1.453** (0.013) 
Destination is in adjacent state -0.091** (0.010) -0.124** (0.011) -0.123** (0.011) 
Destination is in same census division 0.537** (0.012) 0.667** (0.013) 0.666** (0.013) 
Destination is MSA-type - -0.458** (0.025) -0.474** (0.025) 
Cooling degrees-day (5 deg./day, all year) -0.134** (0.032) -0.118** (0.037) -0.106** (0.037) 
Heating degrees-day (5 deg./day, all year) -0.157** (0.017) -0.187** (0.019) -0.190** (0.020) 
Population (tens of th) 0.002** (2.2E-4) 3.9E-4   (2.8E-4) 4.6E-4   (2.8E-4) 
x MSA indicator 0.014** (2.9E-4) 0.019** (3.6E-4) 0.019** (3.6E-4) 
Crime Index -0.017** (0.002) -0.002   (0.002) -0.001   (0.002) 
Pollution 0.066** (0.012) 0.097** (0.014) 0.097** (0.014) 
NAR Median Homes Price 0.032** (0.001) 0.043** (0.002) 0.042** (0.002) 
ACCRA Cost of Living Index -0.046   (0.026) -0.217** (0.032) -0.211** (0.033) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood: -235,797 -235,951 -235,907 
Sample size: 113,834 113,834 113,834 
Number of coefficients: 81 82 88 
Number of parameters: 83 82 88 
Notes:  coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses 
** denotes significance at 1% or better; * is significant at 5% or better 
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Table 1.11: Change in the proportion of population choosing each location following a $10,000 
increase in the Standard Deviation of the location’s earnings distribution; MSA-type locations
Location Name NL 4 CL 4 CL 5 
Akron, OH 3.8% 2.2% 9.0% 
Albuquerque, NM 4.0% 2.5% 25.3% 
Atlanta, GA 5.0% 4.1% 5.4% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 3.6% 2.9% 6.0% 
Baltimore, MD 7.9% 8.3% 10.2% 
Birmingham, AL 4.3% 3.2% 7.1% 
Boise City, ID 5.6% 4.7% 12.5% 
Boston, MA-NH 4.3% 3.5% 11.8% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 1.8% 1.0% -7.5% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 6.8% 6.7% 19.5% 
Chicago, IL 4.4% 3.8% 10.0% 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 6.1% 5.8% 10.3% 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 10.2% 11.0% 2.9% 
Columbia, SC 15.7% 17.8% 36.9% 
Columbus, OH 11.7% 12.6% 5.0% 
Dallas, TX 3.3% 1.9% -8.3% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 8.9% 10.0% 13.1% 
Denver, CO 3.8% 3.0% 7.3% 
Des Moines, IA 22.5% 26.7% 25.0% 
Detroit, MI 5.6% 5.3% 7.7% 
Fort Lauderdale, FL -7.4% -10.4% -19.1% 
Fresno, CA 7.7% 6.3% 23.3% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 19.0% 21.8% 25.1% 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC 16.0% 17.7% 40.6% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 14.2% 16.1% 29.0% 
Hartford, CT 12.2% 13.6% -7.6% 
Houston, TX 2.0% 0.5% -4.0% 
Indianapolis, IN 20.4% 23.9% -5.9% 
Jackson, MS 9.5% 8.7% 24.2% 
Jacksonville, FL 11.3% 12.3% 17.5% 
Kansas City, MO-KS 8.3% 8.3% 42.8% 
Knoxville, TN 5.0% 4.9% 2.0% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 8.4% 8.8% 21.3% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 1.4% -0.8% -1.5% 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA -4.3% -6.9% -14.9% 
Louisville, KY-IN 18.6% 21.9% 37.7% 
Madison, WI 12.0% 12.8% 26.5% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 4.8% 3.9% 1.3% 
Miami, FL 1.3% -4.3% -29.8% 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 9.4% 9.8% 19.5% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 11.8% 13.1% 0.9% 
Nashville, TN 0.4% -1.7% -6.3% 
New Orleans, LA 0.3% -2.1% -7.6% 
New York, NY 2.8% 3.8% -12.7% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC 11.1% 12.2% 30.4% 
Oklahoma City, OK -11.3% -20.0% 9.6% 
Omaha, NE-IA 18.5% 21.9% 35.1% 
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Location Name NL 4 CL 4 CL 5 
Orlando, FL 10.3% 11.7% 10.1% 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 3.0% 1.8% -5.2% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ -2.8% -5.3% -11.2% 
Pittsburgh, PA 5.0% 4.8% 4.2% 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA -1.1% -3.4% -7.4% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 16.7% 19.3% 22.0% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 14.1% 15.9% -5.3% 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 5.5% 6.1% 2.3% 
Rochester, NY 10.3% 10.8% 20.5% 
Sacramento, CA 3.5% 3.4% -2.5% 
St. Louis, MO-IL 9.2% 9.9% 8.1% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 0.7% -1.6% 5.2% 
San Antonio, TX 5.3% 5.3% 3.4% 
San Diego, CA 3.0% 1.9% 3.7% 
San Francisco, CA 4.7% 5.7% -3.9% 
San Jose, CA 31.8% 47.4% 3.4% 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA -2.7% -5.2% 17.4% 
Syracuse, NY 10.0% 10.6% 13.0% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2.4% 1.7% 0.1% 
Toledo, OH 8.5% 8.5% 21.2% 
Tucson, AZ -2.2% -6.1% -13.6% 
Tulsa, OK 13.8% 15.8% 24.1% 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 8.5% 9.0% 13.3% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 11.8% 13.2% 9.6% 
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 16.1% 19.2% 9.5% 
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Table 1.12: Change in the proportion of population choosing each location following a $10,000 
increase in the Mean of the location’s earnings distribution; MSA-type locations 
Location Name NL 4 CL 4 CL 5 
Akron, OH 25.8% 48.9% 36.7% 
Albuquerque, NM 31.3% 57.8% 25.8% 
Atlanta, GA 15.0% 30.2% 28.1% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 21.2% 39.9% 31.6% 
Baltimore, MD 16.8% 34.2% 29.8% 
Birmingham, AL 27.1% 49.4% 42.4% 
Boise City, ID 26.1% 50.6% 46.9% 
Boston, MA-NH 6.8% 15.9% 13.5% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 26.5% 49.4% 51.7% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 15.9% 32.1% 22.1% 
Chicago, IL 7.7% 17.6% 17.0% 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 16.5% 32.4% 32.4% 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 19.9% 39.4% 52.8% 
Columbia, SC 16.7% 36.9% 27.1% 
Columbus, OH 16.6% 34.5% 46.8% 
Dallas, TX 12.9% 26.1% 31.4% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 21.7% 43.2% 39.4% 
Denver, CO 16.6% 32.6% 30.7% 
Des Moines, IA 14.3% 33.4% 54.1% 
Detroit, MI 12.9% 26.8% 28.8% 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 41.2% 70.5% 158% 
Fresno, CA 25.6% 50.2% 29.8% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 15.8% 35.5% 47.4% 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC 17.2% 37.2% 38.3% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 16.9% 36.4% 31.0% 
Hartford, CT 7.0% 18.3% 35.9% 
Houston, TX 16.0% 30.7% 33.2% 
Indianapolis, IN 10.8% 26.1% 62.0% 
Jackson, MS 25.6% 50.2% 33.1% 
Jacksonville, FL 20.9% 42.2% 37.9% 
Kansas City, MO-KS 19.2% 38.2% 7.2% 
Knoxville, TN 24.7% 47.1% 53.2% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 18.8% 37.9% 30.0% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 27.7% 51.7% 44.9% 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 22.2% 38.1% 46.2% 
Louisville, KY-IN 16.4% 36.6% 33.2% 
Madison, WI 20.2% 41.8% 37.1% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 23.5% 45.0% 45.4% 
Miami, FL 24.0% 51.6% -8.9% 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 18.9% 37.9% 36.7% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 16.8% 34.6% 48.4% 
Nashville, TN 25.1% 45.1% 49.0% 
New Orleans, LA 29.1% 53.2% 49.5% 
New York, NY 8.6% 14.8% 19.7% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC 19.9% 41.8% 30.8% 
Oklahoma City, OK 31.7% 57.6% -26.1% 
Omaha, NE-IA 17.8% 39.0% 42.4% 
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Orlando, FL 21.8% 43.5% 46.5% 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 16.0% 31.2% 33.4% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 24.8% 44.5% 47.4% 
Pittsburgh, PA 24.0% 45.9% 42.4% 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 27.6% 49.8% 45.8% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 14.1% 31.8% 33.6% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 20.7% 41.6% 73.3% 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 24.9% 47.8% 49.7% 
Rochester, NY 19.9% 40.3% 38.6% 
Sacramento, CA 25.4% 46.0% 49.2% 
St. Louis, MO-IL 19.8% 39.5% 44.1% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 25.6% 48.5% 33.3% 
San Antonio, TX 27.5% 51.5% 57.6% 
San Diego, CA 20.8% 40.0% 36.4% 
San Francisco, CA -5.5% -6.2% 13.1% 
San Jose, CA -70.5% -108% -79.8% 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 23.7% 42.1% 12.9% 
Syracuse, NY 21.6% 43.6% 43.9% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 22.5% 41.0% 41.8% 
Toledo, OH 25.5% 48.9% 33.6% 
Tucson, AZ 28.1% 52.5% 37.1% 
Tulsa, OK 16.8% 36.2% 38.3% 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 4.9% 14.2% 15.8% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 16.6% 34.8% 39.5% 
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 7.5% 18.4% 28.7% 
 
  
Figure 1.7: Sample migrant/non
 
Figure 1.8: Distance between origin and destination location travelled by migrants
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Figure 1.9: Distance between U.S. state of birth and destination location for migrants 
 
Figure 1.10: Distance between U.S. state of birth and destination location for non-migrants 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER TWO 
1. Construction of Fourier trigonometric terms 
For the housing value equation I am using information in seven continuous variables 
to expand trigonometric terms following Gallant (1981). To avoid the curse of 
dimensionality and to eliminate issues of multi-collinearity which may arise due to the 
Fourier terms, I extract the first five principal components of the continuous variables 
included in (X2*):53 
* * * *
pi p1 p2 p3 p4
* * *
p5 p6 p7
c =γ rooms +γ bedrooms +γ building_age +γ property_tax
+γ property_insurance +γ owner_cost +γ tenure_length
i i i i
i i i
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
 
(1) 
with p = 1…5 and the * indicates that the variable has been standardized (de-meaned 
and divided by standard deviation). The five components explain 91.5% of the variation 
in the continuous variables and form the X2 vector. The five principal components are 
then rescaled using Berger and Mester’s (1997) formula such that they span the (0.1*2pi ; 
0.9*2pi) interval: 
( ) ( ) ( )pi pipi pi
1.6
c =0.2 + c min c
max c min c
r
pi
pi
pi
⋅  ⋅ − −
 
(2) 
  The rescaled components are used to generate unique permutations of 5 components 
taken in groups of 1-5 elements. The following table shows how many of the weighted 
vectors were constructed for each subset of elements: 
                                                          
53
 I order the principal components in decreasing order of their eigenvalues and choose the 5 that 
correspond to the largest eigenvalues. The eigenvalues are 3.10, 1.24, 1.10, 0.60, 0.41, 0.33 and 0.27. 
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Number of elements of X2 
in the group 
a 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of combinations 
b= 5! / [a!*(5-a)!] 
b 5 10 10 5 1 
Number of elementary 
vectors 
c 1 34 100 120 96 
Highest norm† e 1 7 7 6 6 
Example of a vector and 
its norm 
d [1,0,0,0,0] 
Σ|ki|=1 
[1,0,-3,0,0] 
Σ|ki|=4 
[2,-1,0,0,-2] 
Σ|ki|=5 
[1,0,1,-2,-2] 
Σ|ki|=6 
[1,-1,1,-1,1] 
Σ|ki|=5 
Number of terms 
f = b*c  
f 5 340 1,000 600 96 
Notes †Norm = sum of the absolute values of the elements of k 
 
The unique vectors obtained this way are the arguments of the sine and cosine terms. 
For this equation, A=1,951 and J=1. 
For the rental value equation I am using information in three continuous variables to 
expand 1,740 trigonometric terms. I extract the first two principal components which I 
rescale using the same formula as described above. The two components explain 95% the 
variation in the continuous variables and form the X2 vector.54 I use the rescaled 
components to generate unique permutations of two components taken in groups of 1-2 
elements: there are two combinations of one element (i.e. x21 and x22) and one 
combination of two elements (i.e. x21, x22). The combination of two elements is weighted 
using 290 different elementary vectors and such A = 290. Setting J=3 gives us 1,740 
terms. 
2. Construction of a standardized unit of housing 
In this section I show the calculation of a standardized unit of owner-occupied 
housing with the understanding that the standardized unit of renter-occupied housing is 
                                                          
54
 I follow the same procedure as above and retain the two components corresponding to the first 2 
eigenvalues. The eigenvalues are 1.85, 1.00 and 0.15. 
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calculated following a similar procedure but using variables from the renter-occupied 
equation. 
I first replace all indicator variables with their mode, all categorical variables with 
their median/mode and all continuous variables with their means. Variables that enter the 
construction of the principal components need to be standardized first. The categorical 
variables that enter the construction of the principal components, rooms, bedrooms and 
building age are replaced with the standardized value of their medians. The medians are 6 
rooms, 3 bedrooms, 32.5 years for the building age and 7 years for the tenure length (the 
numbers are 4, 2 and 32.5 for the rental units, with no tenure variable). To get the 
standardized value, I use the mean and standard deviation of the original variable. For 
example, for rooms I use the following formula: (6 – 6.6)/1.6 (see Table 2.3A). The 
continuous variables that enter the construction of the principal components are replaced 
with zero, since that is their standardized mean. This gives me principal components 
evaluated at the median values of the variables but they are not rescaled to fit the (0.1*2pi; 
0.9*2pi) interval. To rescale them I use the formula described by equation (2) in this 
Appendix except that min(cpi) and max(cpi) are evaluated on the range of the original 
principal components (the ones used in the estimation of equation 1 in the paper). I then 
re-generate the Fourier terms and calculate the value of a unit with 6 rooms, 3 bedrooms, 
that is 32.5 years old, has been inhabited for about 7 years by the current household, has 
complete plumbing, a separate kitchen, it is not located on a farm, it is heated using 
natural gas, generates $969 in insurance cost, $3,077 in property taxes and $1,744 in 
owner costs (See Table 2.3A). For the renter-occupied unit I assume a unit with 4 rooms, 
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2 bedrooms, it is 32.5 years old, has complete plumbing, a separate kitchen, it is not 
located on a farm, the rent does not include any meals and it is heated using natural gas 
(See Table 2.3B). 
Table 2.9: Goodness of fit for specifications of the owner-occupied housing hedonic function 
Number of 
Fourier terms 
used 
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 2990 3476 3856 
Total number of 
coefficients used 2,080 2,580 3,080 3,580 4,080 4,570 5,056 5,436 
Sample size 404,763 404,763 404,763 404,763 404,763 404,763 404,763 404,763 
Degrees of 
freedom of the 
residual (dfr) 
402,683 402,183 401,683 401,183 400,683 400,193 399,707 399,327 
RMSE 112,256 111,826 111,526 111,255 111,022 110,844 110,640 110,497 
Number of 
restrictions 500 500 500 500 490 486 380 - 
F-statistic 7 5 5 4 4 4 4 - 
p-value <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 - 
 
Table 2.10: Goodness of fit for specifications of the renter-occupied housing hedonic function 
Number of Fourier 
terms used 50 100 150 200 269 
Total number of 
coefficients used 1,631 1,681 1,731 1,781 1,850 
Sample size 189,425 189,425 189,425 189,425 189,425 
Degrees of freedom 
of the residual (dfr) 187,794 187,744 187,694 187,644 187,575 
RMSE 112,256 111,826 111,526 110,640 110,497 
Number of 
restrictions 50 50 50 69 - 
F-statistic 39 36 14 5 - 
p-value <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 - 
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Table 2.11: Correspondence between selected 1990 and 2000 Florida PUMAs 
1990 Survey of Housing and Population ACS 2007 
PUMA code 1600 PUMA code 2203(14,000/129,757) 
2204(100,000/136,988), 
2205(15,000/102,607), 
2206(50,000/141,404) 
MSA 5960 MSA 5960 
County 095 County Multiple 
Aprox. population 1990 164,693 Aprox. Population 2007 510,756 
Note: The population in 1990 PUMA 1600 is covered by PUMAs 2203-2206 in 2000. The first number in 
parenthesis shows the approximate 1990 population of the counties that are now in the 2000 PUMA and the 
second number shows the current 2000 PUMA population. I cannot identify the county in the data and 
eliminate the surplus to get the exact overlapping but I do cover the 1990 population. For example, only 
14,000 people who live in PUMA 2203 in 2000 would have been assigned to PUMA 1600 in 1990. The 
difference 129,757-14,000 would have not been included in Dusansky and Koc (2007)’s sample. 
 
1990 Survey of Housing and Population ACS 2007 
PUMA code 2902 PUMA code 3502 
MSA 8960 MSA 8960 
County 099 County 099 
Aprox. population 1990 117,796 Aprox. population 2007 129,888 
 
1990 Survey of Housing and Population ACS 2007 
PUMA code 4500 PUMA code SPUMA 12084; 12085 
MSA 8280 MSA 8280 
County 057 County 057 
Aprox. Population 1990 834,054 Aprox. population 2007 998,948 
 
1990 Survey of Housing and Population ACS 2007 
PUMA code 3505 PUMA code 3610 
MSA 2680 MSA 2680 
County 011 County 011 
Aprox. Population 1990 125,959 Aprox. population 2007 135,089 
 
1990 Survey of Housing and Population ACS 2007 
PUMA code 3602 PUMA code 4010, 4011 
MSA 5000 MSA 5000 
County 025 County 011 
Aprox. population 1990 214,216 Aprox. population 2007 268,704 
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